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THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND POLICIES OF
TAIWAN: A COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE
Dennis Te-Chung Tangt
Abstract This Article discusses the development of environmental regulation
and preservation in Taiwan in light of United States environmental law. The Article
begins with a discussion of how few measures have been enacted to protect the Taiwan-
ese environment. It then illuminates some of the problems with the Taiwanese environ-
mental regulations that do exist. According to the author, some of these problems
include: ambiguous and conflicting goals enunciated in the legislation; political pressures
on the authorities influencing environmental policies; poor enforcement mechanisms; a
legislative bias in favor of regulating new sources of pollution and against enforcing
regulations in the case of old sources; and little or no litigation over environmental laws.
The author next points out the weaknesses in Taiwan's policy of selective enforcement
and its ineffective use of economic instruments to control pollution. The author
concludes this Article with some suggestions of how Taiwan could improve its
environmental regulation efforts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article provides a critical analysis of the environmental laws*
and policies of the Republic of China (Taiwan), using United States environ-
mental law as a standard of comparison.1 After providing some initial
background to this comparative approach, this Article in Part II demonstrates
prima facie evidence that Taiwanese environmental law is still in a primitive
stage of development. Part HI analyzes further the characteristics of
Taiwan's environmental regulations in contrast to these regulations' United
States counterparts. Part IV examines the Taiwanese policy and practice of
selective enforcement of environmental laws. Part V illustrates how the
application of economic incentives in Taiwan's environmental regulatory
regime has been distorted. Part VI makes some policy suggestions for
improvement of the Republic of China's regulatory efforts.
Although the Republic of China (ROC) generally is perceived to be a
member of the Civil (Continental) Law family, many newly developed and
more technological fields of law in Taiwan, such as environmental law, sub-
stantially follow the examples set by the United States. An explanation for
this deviation lies in the fact that since World War II, Taiwan has been
influenced predominantly by the United States, both economically and
politically. Because attorneys generally lack technical expertise in the new
and technological field of environmental law, bureaucrats with
environmental engineering backgrounds have drafted all of Taiwan's
* For the purposes of this Article, the author has translated the Taiwan Statutes and regulations into
English.
1 For other ROC-United States comparative environmental law studies see, DENNIS T. TANG, ON
THE FEASIBILITY OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN TAIWAN's ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: LESSONS FROM
THE AMERIcAN EXPERIENCE (1990).
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environmental statutes.2 Not surprisingly, most influential engineers in
Taiwan have been educated in the United States.3
II. A PRLmrvE REGULATORY REGIME
During the 1970s, the people of the United States witnessed a decade
in which numerous significant environmental statutes came into effect.
These statutes essentially established an environmental law framework.
During this same period, law schools began to offer courses in
environmental law. In contrast, the establishment of Taiwan's
Environmental Protection Administration (TEPA) in 1987, generally
regarded as a milestone for the environmental era in Taiwan, came almost
twenty years after the United States' enactment of major environmental
laws.4
Soon after its establishment, the TEPA proposed an ambitious plan to
construct a comprehensive environmental law scheme. Due to various
internal conflicts, 5 however, the Legislative Yuan (ROC's Congress) has
enacted little legislation designed to implement the TEPA's goals. 6 In a
strict sense, no more than a dozen statutes primarily aimed at environmental
protection exist. Table 1 illustrates the sharp contrast between the volume of
ROC and United States environmental laws. 7
2 Environmental law was first formally offered as a course in Taiwan's law schools during the 1988
academic year.
3 As a result of the nonlegal background of the drafters, most environmental legislation, as
compared with traditional forms of legislation, is noticeably poorer in terms of legislative technique, and is
marked by redundant, unintended, and ambiguous phrases. The problem also can be partly attributed to the
lack of professional legislative staff available to the members of the Legislative Yuan.
4 TEPA was established on August 22, 1987. The Bureau of Environmental Protection, within the
Department of Health, was TEPA's predecessor and was established in 1982. The Administrator of the
TEPA has still not achieved formal Cabinet status, although he is entitled to sit in on Cabinet meetings.
5 The members of the Legislative Yuan, a primary power institution under the Constitution, have
been much more preoccupied with a struggle for the redistribution of political power in the post Chiang
Ching-Kuo era. Since Chiang's death in 1988, the Constitution has been amended twice, in 1991 and
1992. In addition, the prolonged interpellations, ineptly-organized committees, poorly defined rules and
procedures, and even violent confrontations among members contribute to unprecedented inefficiency in
the legislative process.
bBesides two organizational statutes, the Legislative Yuan has enacted only two environmental
statutes: the Statute for Settling Public Nuisance Disputes of 1992 and the Wildlife Conservation Act of
1988. The latter does not fall under TEPA's jurisdiction. The Legislative Yuan also has substantially
revised three major laws: the Air Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1992, the Noise Control Act
Amendments of 1992, and the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1991. It also has enacted
minor revisions to two acts: the Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1988, and the Toxic Chemicals
Control Act Amendments of 1988.
7 The United States laws appear in regular type, while those of the ROC have been indicated in bold
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In terms of traditional command-and-control regulations, the Water
Pollution Control Act (WPCA) and the Air Pollution Control Act (APCA)
represent Taiwan's most advanced environmental statutes. Enacted in 1974
and amended in 1983 and 1991, the WPCA consists of sixty-three articles.
The APCA, first enacted in 1975 and amended in 1982 and 1992, consists of
fifty-five articles. Due to the differences in legislative techniques, a gesetz
or loi in a Civil (Continental) Law state typically is more concise than a
statute or an act in an Anglo-American (Common) Law state. Nevertheless,
it is still evident that the WPCA and the APCA are woefully incomplete and
inadequate when compared to their grander United States counterparts, the
Clean Water Act (CWA)8 and the Clean Air Act (CAA).9 The contrast
between the Taiwanese WPCA and the APCA, on one hand, and the United
States CWA and CAA, on the other, serves as an illustration of the primitive
status of the environmental regulatory law regime in Taiwan.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF POLLUTION REGULATIONS
A closer examination of the WPCA and APCA reveals that their
weaknesses are common features of, and, to various degrees, shared by, all
pollution-combating statutes in Taiwan.
A. Ambiguous Statutory Goals with Loose Connections to Pollution
Control Mechanisms
The United States Clean Air Act mandates that the federal regulatory
agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), set up nationally
uniform legal ceilings, known as national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS), a goal to be achieved by each of the 247 air quality control
regions (AQCR) covering the entire United States within specific
deadlines. 10 In addition to the four types of federal uniform emission
8 The Clean Water Act is composed of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and accompanying
amendments. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter CWA].
9 The Clean Air Act is composed of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act and
accompanying amendments. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 74 01-767lq (1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter CAA].
I The CAA of 1970 provided that the air quality in each AQCR meet the primary NAAQS by May
31, 1975. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c5(a)(A)(i) (1976). The 1977 Amendments first distinguished the "clean"
air areas, also known as "attainment areas" [or "PSD areas"], from the "dirty" areas, also known as
"nonattainment areas" [hereinafter NA areas], on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis. It then set a new deadline
of December 31, 1982, for the latter areas to meet the primary NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(l)-(2)(1988). The 1990 Amendments provided no less than 16 new and improved deadlines by subdividing the
ozone NA areas into five different classifications (marginal, moderate, serious, severe, and extreme), and
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standards11 set by the EPA, the states have primary responsibility for
attaining the legislative goals by designing and implementing their own
individual state implementation plans (SIPs).12
In contrast, before 1992, Taiwan's APCA only mandated emissions
standards, without establishing any ambient standards. Moreover, although
there were in practice "Environmental Air Quality Standards for the Taiwan
Area, Republic of China,"13 these standards only served as reference points
with no binding legal authority. 14 Nor did the APCA contain SiPs or
functional equivalents. Even if one believed in the desirability of these air
quality standards, it was unclear how these standards possibly could be
implemented on a system-wide basis.
The 1992 Amendments attempted to make improvements, but were
not quite successful. As amended, Section 1, Article 5 of the Act requires
that the regulatory agencies of provincial and county governments, 15 after
consulting relevant agencies, designate, in accordance with the air quality
standards, various classes 16 of control regions based on the current air
quality of each region. Section 2 of Article 5 prescribes that, "[The air
quality standards mentioned in Section 1 shall, after consultation with
relevant agencies, be promulgated by the central regulatory agency [i.e., the
the carbon monoxide NA areas, as well as PM-10 NA areas, into two classifications (moderate and serious)
with distant compliance dates up to 2001. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-13 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
11 There are emission standards for new motor vehicles, new (stationary) sources performance
standards (NSPS), national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAP), and reasonably
available control technology (RACT) applicable to the existing stationary sources in the nonattainment
areas. Id.
12 The SIP is a final catch-all device in the CAA. The state regulatory agency has to estimate and
determine the extent to which ambient air standards are exceeded, before they allocate the reduction
burdens among the regulated sources. The state evaluations include consideration of the emission
reduction that will result from the application of federal emission standards. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51-52 (1991).
13 The standards first were promulgated by the Health Administration, Executive Yuan, in 1975. In
1984 the Bureau of Environmental Protection within the Health Administration proposed, but did not
formally make public, another set of air quality standards for the period from 1989 to 1993, and the period
after 1994, respectively. In 1990 a more updated version of uniform standards modeled after the United
States NAAQS was published by the TEPA. See TEPA PuBLIc NoTicE No. 7,457 (Mar. 12, 1990).
14 Footnote 3 of the 1990 ROC Air Quality Standards [hereinafter AQS] is ample evidence of this
point: "The above-stated standards serve as reference for judging the degree of air pollution in the public
living environments."
15 The administrative districts now under the jurisdiction of the ROC include two provinces,
Taiwan and Fuchien, and two metropolitan municipalities, Taipei and Kaohsiung. The hierarchical
structure of Taiwan Province includes sixteen counties (Hsien) and five provincial municipalities. The
Fuchien Province includes only three groups of strategic offshore islands, known as Chingmen, Matsu and
Tungying, besides Fuchien, Mainland China.
16 In the Implementation Rules for the APCA (art. 7) promulgated in February of 1993, the TEPA
classifies the control regions into three classes (Class I, II & I) modeled after the United States CAA
Amendments of 1977.
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TEPA]." However, because of ambiguities in the language, these newly
added provisions fail to unequivocally establish air quality standards as
statutory goals.
Section 1, Article 5 of the APCA is reasonably subject to two different
interpretations. The first is that there shall be several sets of air quality
standards that vary according to the type of local control region at issue. 17
The other interpretation is that there shall be only one uniform set of air
quality standards that the various control regions are required to meet by a
specified deadline.
In April of 1992, the TEPA promulgated the Air Quality Standards
(AQS),18 which are modeled after the United States Primary NAAQS.19
This modelling means that the first interpretation of a regime of varying
local air quality standards must be rejected. Nevertheless, whether the AQS
are intended as a uniform set of standards to be pursued under the Act, as the
second possible interpretation would allow, is still unclear as the Act
nowhere prescribes specific or even general time deadlines for the
attainment of the AQS by control regions. The 1992 Amendments, also for
the first time, ordained: '"The regulatory agencies of provincial and county
government shall, in accordance with the AQS, develop plans for
maintaining or improving air quality in each of the various classes of control
regions." 20 However, the Act does not provide any deadlines for developing
such SIP equivalents or any sanctions for noncompliance by provincial and
county governments.
On the other hand, the revised APCA continues to rely on emission
standards to clean the air. Articles 11 and 23 require both stationary and
mobile sources to abide by emission standards. 21 Since these emission stan-
17 This interpretation is especially plausible in light of the definition that appeared in Section 2 of
the Act:
Air pollution control regions means various classes of regions delineated according to the air
quality needed for their land use purpose, or upon the status quo of their air qualities.
Since the needed air quality varies for various land uses, the air quality standards shall not be unified. As
to the debate of uniform versus variant air quality standards, see e.g., James E. Krier, The Irrational
National Air Quality Standards: Macro-and-Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974).
18 See TEPA REISTER No. 53, at 23 (May 1992). Notably, the original footnote 3 of the 1990
AQS (see supra note 14) was eliminated in the 1992 AQS.
19 Though the 1992 Amendments added "protection of the living environment" to the original
"protection of public health" as the legislative purpose announced in Article 1, the AQS in Taiwan contains
only one set of ambient limitations. In contrast, the United States NAAQS include primary and secondary
standards for the assurance of "public health" and "public welfare" respectively. See 42 U.S.C. §
7409(b)(l)-(2)(1988). Table 2 compares the ROC standards with those in the United States.
2u APCA, art. 6.
21 Section I of Article 11 reads as follows: "The stationary sources emitting air pollutants in public
or private places shall be in compliance with emission standards." APCA, art. 11, § I (Taiwan). The
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dards refer to pollutant concentrations only, the effect of enforcing these
standards on the improvement of ambient air quality is difficult to predict.
22
As for water pollution, the ROC's WPCA has not followed the United
States Clean Water Act in embracing a "zero-pollution" goal.23 This is
evidenced by Article 5 of the WPCA: "In order not to interfere with the
usages of water, no person shall be allowed to utilize water as media in
receiving or transporting discharges beyond the assimilative capacity24 of
the water." Section 1, Article 6 of the Act sets forth the major regulatory
mechanisms: "The control agency of the central government (TEPA) shall,
based on the characteristics of the body water and the situation of its basin,
specify water zones as well as set up water classification and water quality
standards." United States environmental lawyers who read these two provi-
sions may reasonably conclude that the heart of the WPCA's regulatory
author suggests striking out "in public or private places" because the APCA defines "a source" as "a
particular unit of physical or chemical operation" (art. 2(2)), rather than "an entire plant."
Section 1 of Article 23 provides: "The modes of transportation emitting air pollutants shall be in
compliance with emission standards." APCA, art. 23, § I (Taiwan). The author suggests replacing
"modes of transportation" with "mobile sources" since the most seriously polluting vehicles and tools used
in civil engineering cannot be suitably classified as "modes of transportation" in Chinese. In the newly
promulgated Implementation Rules for the APCA, the TEPA defined "stationary sources" and "mobile
sources." APCA, art. 3 (Taiwan). The deficiency is not fixed, however, since the APCA itself never
mentioned "mobile sources," but only "modes of transportation."
22 In addition, the 1992 amendments tried, for the first time, to establish a comprehensive permit
system by both subjecting all new and modified sources specified by the TEPA to a preconstruction review
by the provincial or municipal control agencies and by requiring them to apply for operation permits from
the provincial or municipal control agencies. See APCA, arts. 14, 15, 50 (Taiwan).
23 The United States philosophy under pre-1972 laws was only to pursue the best water quality for
designated classifications of water usage at the most economic price. However, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972 established the elimination of all "discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters . . . by 1985" as a national goal (the so-called "zero pollution" goal), while mandating that
"wherever attainable," a "water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by ... 1983" as an interim goal
(the "fishable-swimmable" goal). 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I)-(2) (1988).
24 "Assimilative capacity" refers to the "maximum amount of pollutants [that] can be allowed
without interfering [with] the normal usage(s) of a particular water." WPCA, art. 2(15) (Taiwan).
Yet what is "normal usage(s)"? Article 11 of the newly promulgated Implementation Rules made
another clarification:
That no person shall be allowed to utilize water as a media in receiving or transporting
discharges beyond the assimilative capacity of the water, as prescribed in Article 5 of the
WPCA, means that the water quality changes because of the total effluent discharged by all of
the polluting sources which utilize water as media in receiving or transporting discharges
cannot exceed the water classification and water quality standards prescribed in Article 6 of
the WPCA.
WPCA, art. 11 (Taiwan). This clarification successfully connects the assimilative-capacity-oriented
regulatory approach announced in Article 5 with the water classification and water quality standards
prescribed in Article 6. However, the purpose of "water classification" and the relationship between water
classifications and water quality standards is still not clear.
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program lies in water quality standards, similar to the United States Water
Quality Act of 1965. It is unclear, however, that ROC lawyers would read
these ambiguous words and reach the same conclusion.
In the United States, the practice of a water-quality-based approach
for combating pollution involves three essential components. "First, a
determination is made concerning the present and future uses of each body
[of water]. Second, the specific water quality characteristics allowed or
required for such uses [are] identified and descriptive or numerical values
[for each of them, known as water quality criteria, are established. Finally,]
a precise, detailed plan for achieving and preserving the criteria established"
is proposed and implemented. 25
In contrast to the well-ordered functioning of this process in the
United States, the Taiwanese application of this approach suffers from
confusion. First, the poorly phrased provisions cited above seriously
obscure the "due process" for effectively carrying out specific tasks.
Revisions are required to clarify the relations among the concepts of "water
zones," "usages of water," and "water classification and water quality
standards." 26
Second, combining "water usage classifications" and "water quality
standards" in the same legal documents obscures matters further.27 The for-
mer classifies water usages into seven categories, including public water
supply, agriculture (covering irrigation, aquaculture, and livestock), hydro-
power generation, navigation, conservation and recreation, industrial
utilization, and others. The latter not only subdivides public water supply
into three classes and aquacultural and industrial utilization into two classes,
25 See N. Williams Hines, Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9 B.C.
INDus. & COM. L. REV. 553, 585-86 (1968).
26 Due to the legislative oversight, an unnecessary inconsistency is the use of "water usage" in art. 5
and "water classifications" in art. 6. To be consistent, the latter should be changed into "water usage
classifications." In particular, the author suggests that art. 5 remain unchanged as an announcement of the
water-quality-standards-based approach, while art. 6 be revised as follows:
The control agency of the central government shall, after consulting relevant agencies,
promulgate water usage classifications and water quality standards. The latter shall describe
the water quality characteristics required for such classes of usage identified in the former.
The control agency of the central government shall, after consulting relevant provincial and
municipal governments, divide the nation's waters into water zones.
The provincial and municipal governments shall adopt and submit to the control agency of
the central government a plan which provides for the present and future uses of the water in
each water zone within their jurisdiction and the methods for achieving and preserving the
applicable water quality standards in the water zones.
27 Currently, the water usage classifications appear in both Section 7 of the Implementation Rules
for the WPCA and Section 2 of the Water Classification and Water Quality Standards. See TEPA,
COMPILATION OF ENviRoNMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IV-24-30 (1992).
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but also fixes two sets of standards; one for surface water and another for
ocean water.28 For the purpose of setting standards, surface water and
ocean water are re-sorted into five and three classes respectively. To avoid
the confusion created by so many categories, it would be better if all water
usage classifications were identified in one document, and all water quality
standards were established in another document with each identified usage
stated in numerical terms.
The third, and probably the most telling, source of confusion is the
practice by the TEPA and other regulatory agencies of enforcing only the
effluent standards, although there are at least twenty-six water zones
29
specified by the Taiwan Provincial Government. 30 Section 1, Article 7 of
the revised WPCA provides: "Industries, municipal sewage treatment
systems and building sewage treatment facilities31 discharging waste water
into surface waters shall be in conformity with the effluent standards."
32
Like emission standards under the APCA, the effect of enforcing effluent
standards on the water quality of a particular basin is hard to predict since
the standards are set only in terms of density limitations. Until the WPCA's
latest amendment in 1991, the relationship between water quality standards
and effluent standards was not clear. There were no limits based on water
quality, such as the United States limits on total maximum daily loads
(TMDL)33 or water quality related effluent limits (WQREL).34  As a result,
effluent standards, like APCA emission standards, are designed to serve
purely as mechanisms for scaling down pollution levels without imposing
restrictions based on water quality.
28 The items in the standards specified for surface water and ocean water are similar, including DO,
fecal coliform bacteria, BOD5/TSS, NH3 .H, heavy metals, and commonly-used fertilizers. Id. Yet the
standards for the ocean water are generally more lenient. Id.
29 See TEPA, COMPILATION OF ENvIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IV-104 (1992).
30 Another problem is that the current Water Classification and Water Quality Standards were
promulgated by TEPA's predecessor, the Health Administration, Executive Yuan, in 1985. The TEPA has
not even bothered to update them.
31 The incorporation of sewage treatment facilities of the buildings into the effluent standards
system may be based upon the fact that the overall ratio of sewer connections in the Taiwan area is still
very low. (It is only about 2%, far behind the United States ratio, which was about 72% in 1979). See The
Construction Project of Sewers (1988) (appearing in TEPA, COMPILATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS IV-126 (1992)).
32 The effluent standards consist of three sets of standards applicable for periods prior to December
31, 1992, from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, and from January 1, 1998, respectively. Each set
includes the standards for municipal sewage treatment works, building sewage treatment facilities,
industrial (and specified enterprises) discharges, as well as the common ones for all types of sources
above-mentioned. See TEPA, COMPILATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IV-31 to 54
(19923. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (1988).
34 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988).
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Section 1, Article 9 of the WPCA Amendments of 1991 for the first
time embraced the concept of "aggregate amount of discharge regulation." 35
Until a comprehensive permit system for all point sources 36 is established,
however, this new policy cannot be implemented. Fortunately, the 1991
Amendments did call for the establishment within two years of a permit sys-
tem requiring permits not only for new and modified sources, 37 but also for
existing sources.38
In sum, contemporary ROC environmental statutes establish no
specific environmental goals. All efforts seem to have focused merely on
the use of emission and effluent standards as an abatement mechanism, even
though establishing a comprehensive permit system is the most challenging
task confronting the regulatory agencies of Taiwan.
B. Autonomy and Discretion of Regulatory Authorities
The autonomy and discretion enjoyed by Taiwanese regulatory
authorities can be attributed to several causes. First, current statutes contain
few restrictions in the delegation of legislative powers to the control
agencies. ROC constitutional law does not require that rulemaking by an
administrative agency be guided by "an intelligible principle" set forth in the
enabling statute, as required in the United States. 39 Moreover, the content,
35 Section 1 provides:
The control agencies of provincial/municipal governments shall, based on the assimilative
capacity of the waters, regulate the aggregate effluent of discharged water, whenever all or part
of a particular water either
(1) cannot attain the applicable water quality standards within the limitations imposed by
effluent standards due to the concentration of industry; or
(2) needs special protection.
36 The WPCA only regulates the enterprises designated by the central control agency and sewage
systems. The former are equivalent to the selected industrial dischargers whereas the latter may be
equivalent to municipal dischargers or "publicly owned treatment works." Though the effluent of
buildings' sewage treatment facilities are subject to effluent standards, a building is not required to apply
for a permit for discharging effluent.
In contrast, the regulated objects in the American CWA contain both point sources and nonpoint
sources. A point source is defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, conduit.., from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988). The nonpoint sources are mainly land use activities, such as agriculture,
mininf, and forestry, that cause run-off into streams. Id.
37 See § 14 (for new and modified industrial sources); and § 19 (for new municipal sources).
38 Article 59 of the WPCA reads: "Industrial and municipal sources which already were in
existence before the Amendments shall, within the period of two years from the enactment of the
Amendments, apply for a discharge permit in accordance with Articles 14 and 19 of this Act."
39 Cf. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Cargo of the Brig Aurora v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382,386 (1813).
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purpose, or boundary of such a legislative delegation need not be
unambiguously specified in the enabling statute.40  Instead, ROC
administrative agencies receive blank authorizations and enjoy, at least in
theory, limitless discretion in deciding the stringency of various emission
and effluent standards, as well as in selecting items for regulations.
In the United States, by contrast, environmental standards generally
are legislated according to intelligible principles that are either health-based
or technology-based. For example, the primary NAAQS have to be set
"requisite to protect public health" but "allowing an adequate margin of
safety." 41  Various emission and effluent standards, such as "new source
performance standards" (NSPS) for the new and modified nonmajor
stationary air pollution sources, "best practicable control technology" (BPT)
standards and "best available technology economically achievable" (BAT)
standards for existing industrial water pollution sources, are to be set based
on considerations of technological as well as economic feasibility. 42 In
contrast, the ROC's APCA and WPCA mandate emission and effluent stan-
dards without explicitly or implicitly dictating that these standards be tech-
nology-based.
Second, the absence of an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
Taiwan43 has further liberated administrative rule-making. Taiwan's lack of
an APA means that environmental statutes contain no pre-enactment
procedural requirements such as the notice-comments procedures typically
employed in the United States.44 In addition, judicial review of adminis-
40 Germany, for example, requires the specification of content (Inhah), purpose (Zweck), and
boundary (Ausmass) of such legislative delegation. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG], art. 80, § 1.
41 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1988). See TANG, supra note 1, at 413 (tbl. 2-4) for details.
42 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1988). The EPA should consider "the reasonableness of
the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits
derived." See TANG, supra note 1, at 415-416 (tbl. 2-6) for details. German law contains similar statutory
mandates. Section 7(a), Wasserhaushaltsgesetz [WHG] (the minimum requirement set by the federal
government shall be consistent with the "commonly recognized technical standards" (allgemein
anerkannten Regeln der Technik)).
43 A draft of an Administrative Procedure Act was produced in the end of 1990 as the result of a
research project sponsored by the central government. See COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT, EXECUTIVE YUAN, COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACTS 43-
178 (1990) for the draft. The author was a member of the research committee responsible for drafting the
rule-making procedures (§§ 98-112 of the draft). See Dennis Tang, On Rule-making Procedures-An
Experiment in the Chinese Transformation of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act, in id. at 321, for
details.
44 This does not mean, however, there are no procedural requirements at all. The most common
requirements are "consulting relevant agencies" and "submitting to the TEPA for approval." See, e.g.,
notes 15-16 and accompanying text (APCA, art. 5, § 1).
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trative rule-making, well-established under the United States APA,45 is
unavailable in Taiwan. Under the current Taiwanese system, the setting of
standards is general and abstract in nature and therefore does not constitute
an "administrative action."'46 An administrative action is currently the only
form of administrative decisionmaking reviewable by the ROC
Administrative Court.47  As a result, environmental agencies are
substantially free from the constraint and pressure of potential litigation
challenging the propriety of promulgated standards. 48 In practice, when
confronted with criticism, the TEPA usually claims that the standards
Moreover, there are poorly designed "double-key" procedural requirements. For instance, the APCA
creates the hurdle of two rounds of confrontation that a local government must overcome before adopting
more stringent emission standards. Section 2, Article 11 provides:
The emission standards mentioned in the first subsection of this article shall be promulgated by
the control agency of the central government. But the control agency of the
provincial/municipal and county/city governments may, based on special need, propose more
stringent emission standards for specific industries or areas, and submit it to the control agency
of the central government for approval The latter shall consult relevant agencies before
making its final decision. [emphasis added].
See William F. Pederson, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1059, at 1078-
79 (1981) for criticism of the two rounds of public notice and comment procedures for revising a SIP in the
United States.
45 "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1988).
46 The prevailing definition of an administrative action (Vervaltungsakt) contains the following five
elements:
1) it is an action of an administrative agency;
2) it is an action which has direct legal effects;
3) it is an action of public law;
4) it is a unilateral action;
5) it is an action for a particular case (matter).
See, e.g., Weng, On the Concept of Administrative Action, in Y. WANG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
MODERN RULE-Op-LAW STATE 1, 8-36 (1976).
47 Although scholars commonly believe that courts are entitled to incidentally review the legality of
the rules and regulations upon which the administrative action under dispute is based (see, e.g., Weng, On
the Judicial Review ofillegal Rules, in Y. WANG, supra note 46, at 109 (1987)) and the Council of Grand
Justices, the counterpart of the United States Supreme Court, also supports such a viewpoint (see, e.g.,
Interpretation No. 137: "Though judges in deciding cases may not refuse to apply all relevant rules and
interpretations of an applicable statute promulgated by an administrative agency, they are still entitled,
based upon the statute, to express their legal and appropriate opinions about these administrative rules and
interpretations."), few administrative rules have been reviewed and overturned in practice.
To correct this institutional deficiency, the Judicial Yuan proposed, mainly modeled after the German
Administrative Court Rules (Vervaltungsrichtsordnung), a draft of Amendments to the Administrative
Litigation Act in 1988. Article 2 of the draft provides that all disputes of public law are revisable by the
Administrative Court, except when another statute prescribes otherwise.
48 Based on the author's knowledge, there have not been any cases challenging the technological
feasibility of these standards.
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promulgated are reasonable by referring to the relevant applicable standards
in the United States49 and other developed countries.
The third major factor is that environmental statutes contain no action-
forcing provisions or provisions for citizen suits. In the United States, the
EPA has a legal obligation to set up various standards within statutory dead-
lines. 50 If the EPA fails to perform its nondiscretionary duties, any public
interest-minded citizen can sue the Administrator for the failure.51 Since no
such Taiwanese provisions exist for action enforcement or citizen suits,52
the environmental protection agencies in Taiwan have established standards
freer from external pressure.53 On the other hand, some indications suggest
that, while these institutional deficiencies effectively have kept average
citizens (and probably most environmental groups) outside the standard-
49 The standards set by the TEPA are generally somewhat lower than their counterparts in the
United States. See TEPA, A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS IN THE ROC AND
OTHER CouNTRmiEs (Aug. 29, 1991)
50 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)-(1) (1988): The Administrator
(A) within 30 days after December 31, 1970, shall publish proposed regulations prescribing a
national primary ambient air quality standard and a national secondary ambient air quality
standard for each air pollutant for which air quality criteria have been issued prior to such date
of enactment; and
(B) after a reasonable time for interested persons to submit written comments thereon (but no
later than 90 days after the initial publication of such proposed standards) shall by regulation
promulgate such proposed national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards with
such modifications as he deems appropriate.
The 1977 Amendments require that each of these standards be reviewed every five years. 42 U.S.C. §7409(dl(I)(1988).
5 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1988); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act § 20(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1988); Endangered
Species Act of 1973 § l(g)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(l)(A) (1988).
52 See discussion infra part III.E.
53 For instance, Section 8(2) of APCA of 1982 requires that stationary sources which utilize, emit,
or may expose the hazardous air pollutants specified by the regulatory agency shall install autonomous
self-monitoring equipment and an alarm system. Accordingly, Section 17(2) of the Implementation Rules
of APCA states that a guideline for installing such self-monitoring and alarm systems be jointly
promulgated by the TEPA, the subject business regulatory agency and the labor regulatory agency. Yet
such an installation guideline has still not seen the light of day. A similar provision can be found in
Section 2, Article 31 of the 1992 Amendments.
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setting process, well-organized industries may have been influential54 in
environmental decisionmaking. 55
C. Overview of Regulatory Standards
Regulatory standards of varying levels are usually set for different
industries or enterprises, and according to size, production process utilized,
and fuels employed. The distinction between new and existing sources,
however, lies only in different deadlines for meeting the same applicable
standards.
The current Air Pollutants Emission Standards for emission of No2
from Stationary Sources56 are divided into combustion processes and non-
combustion processes. The former vary depending upon the sulphur content
of the fuels used. Similarly, the standards for particulates first are divided
into two sets, one for enterprise (hazardous) waste incinerating facilities and
the other for other processes. Standards for enterprise waste incinerating
facilities are further subdivided into two sets based upon their treatment
54 In response to soaring criticisms from the industry, President Lee, acting as the Chairman in a
conference within the ruling KMT party, instructed the TEPA Administrator Jaw to review the proprieties
of effluent standards. See UNrrED DAILY NEWS, Sept. 1, 1992. And, after negotiations with the
representatives from industry, the TEPA has agreed to lower some of the standards. See UNrrED DAILY
NEws, Oct. 3, 1992.
For a general picture of how the pressure groups have influenced the decisionmaking process of
administrative agencies, see COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION, EXECUTIVE
YUAN, A STUDY ON THE PARTICIPATION OF INTEREST GROUPS IN POLIrCAL PROCESSES (1989).
55 Legal channels exist for the interest groups. For example, Section 7 of the Act for Standardizing
Laws and Ordinances of the Central Government (Chung Yang Fa Kuei Piao Chung Fa) requires
administrative rules (regulations) "to be sent to the Legislative Yuan" immediately after issuance or
publication. In practice, the administrative rules are usually reviewed by each corresponding committee in
the Legislative Yuan and the committees may recommend the Legislative Yuan to remand the regulations
for revisions. See Congressional Rules, § 8. Though one may argue whether the cited provision is a
"legislative veto," see generally Dennis Tang, The Three-Branch Constitution, the Four-Branch
Government, and the Legislative Veto-A Critical Review of INS v. Chadha, 16(2) AM. STUD. 27 (1986), a
committee in the Legislative Yuan does, in a subtle yet substantial way, influence the decision-making of
an agency. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such a practice, see C. Schu, On the Congressional
Supervision of the Administrative Rules, in C. SCHU, LAW AND STATE POWER 269,273 (1992); Tang, supra
note 43, at 361-62 n.82.
56 See TEPA REGISTER No. 53, at 2-22 (May 1992). The pollutants regulated thereby include not
only the so-called "criteria pollutants" of the United States (such as TSP, SO 2, but also other pollutants
(such as black smoke) and hazardous pollutants (such as asbestos and cadmium).
Prior to its amendment in 1992, Article 6 of the APCA required the provincial or municipal
governments to propose emission standards for stationary sources and to submit them to the control agency
of the central government for approval. Yet similar standards can be found in the Air Pollutants Emission
Standards for Stationary Sources in the Taiwan Province of 1986. See TEPA, COMPILATION OF
ENVRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS II-36 to 11-58 (1992).
S-102
SPEC. ED. 1993 ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS & POLICIES: TAIWAN
capacities. 57 This practice of setting standards of differing stringency based
on "fundamentally different factors" (FDF)58 illustrates that economic and
technological feasibility are in fact taken into account by the regulatory
agencies in setting various discharge standards, even though such
consideration is not required by law.
More importantly, the same applicable standards typically are applied
to both new and existing sources, although the latter are given a few years to
meet the standards.59 This differs sharply from the United States practice
under which new sources always are subject to more stringent standards than
those applied to existing sources. This departure may be due to several
reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, current ROC laws do not mandate that
standards be technology-based. Second, the emission and effluent standards
promulgated by the Taiwanese, as compared to those implemented in the
United States, are still lenient. Third, and probably most telling, the current
standards have not been seriously enforced, 60 and thus, their economic and
technological feasibilities have not been tested. In any event, the "new
source bias" 61 prevalent in the United States practice has not troubled the
regulatory agencies in Taiwan.
Looking at the evolution of emission standards (both for stationary
sources and mobile sources) and effluent standards, one can easily recognize
57 The divisions are below 400 kg/Nm3 as well as 400 kg/Nm3 and above. The variance of effluent
standards for livestock farms based on size (for farms breeding over 1,000 pigs, as well as for those
breeding between 200 and 999 pigs) is another example. See TEPA, COMPILATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS AND REGULATIONS IV-31, IV-37 (1992).
58 The term originally was found in 40 C.F.R. § 421.12 (1974). If an individual discharger
demonstrates that it deserves different treatment based upon "factors relating to the equipment or facilities
involved, the process applied, or other such factors considered in the establishment of the guidelines," the
EPA may grant a variance to the otherwise applicable effluent limitations. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1992)
for the current version. The author simply borrows the idea here.
59 See, e.g., Air Pollutants Emission Standards for Stationary Sources, TEPA REGISTER No. 53, at
2-22 (May, 1992); Measures Controlling Noise from Mobile Sources, § 4, TEPA, COMPI.ATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 111-27 (1992). In the former, the more lenient deadlines for
existing sources to meet the same standards are varied depending upon their location, i.e., those located in
the dirtiest (Taipei and Kaohsiung Metropolitan Areas) and cleanest areas (Hwalien County and Taitung
County) shall meet the standards within a shorter period. This illustrates again how the TEPA can exercise
unfettered discretion. It should be noted that the effluent standards under the WPCA do not distinguish
new sources from existing sources.
60 See discussion infra part IV.
61 Taking coal-fired power plants, for example, the cost of sulfur abatement in new Western coal-
fired plants is approximately four times the incremental cost for existing power plants. See ROBERT W.
CRANDALL, CONTROUING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 36-37
(Table 3-1) (1983).
S-103
PACIFC RiM LAW & PoLIcY JOURNAL
the general pattern of "guided incrementalism," 62 whereby agencies raise
standards phase by phase. For example, the effective dates set for effluent
standards to become more stringent are January 1, 1993 and January 1, 1998,
while the relevant dates for emission standards for stationary sources are
July 1, 1989 and July 1, 1993.63
D. Scope of Regulatory Standards
In the United States, both pollutant concentration standards and mass
discharge rates64 are employed in considering the issuance of discharge
permits (Table 3). In Taiwan all emission or effluent standards regulate
pollutant concentration only and are applied directly, without transforming
the standards into particular discharge quantity limitations for individual
sources. For example, the current Air Pollutants Emission Standards for
Stationary Sources provide two types of emission standards for each of the
regulated pollutants: one for emissions directly emitted from stacks; and the
other for emissions measured by ambient air quality changes in the
neighborhood. Both standards are prescribed only in terms of density.65
This practice may have been initiated for the convenience of
inspection prior to the establishment of a comprehensive permit system.
Nonetheless, it has caused a number of problems. First, as mentioned
earlier, together with the lack of SIPs, no one can ascertain or even roughly
predict what kind of air (or environmental) quality exists in Taiwan by
enforcing these emission standards. Second, the measurement of changes in
ambient air concentration around the polluting source inspected is a very
controversial device, because it is not easy to distinguish background
pollution caused by neighboring sources from the actual emissions of the
inspected source.66 Despite this difficulty, the Administrative Court has
62 David Foster, Planning for the Development of Economic Incentives under Institutional
Constraints: The Role for Guided Incrementalism, in BUYING A BrTER ENVIRONMENT CosT-EFFEcrIVE
REGULATION THROUGH PERMn" TRADING 71, 76 (E. Joeres & M. David eds., 1983).
63 Similar landmarks are identified in the Air Pollutants Emission Standards for Modes of
Transportation. Those for new vehicles are: July 1, 1987, July 1, 1990, Aug. 1, 1992 and July 1, 1995.
See TEPA REGISTR No. 56, at 10-16 (Aug. 1992). See also supra note 32.
64 Mass discharge rates are measured by pollutant weight per unit input, output, or time period.
65 The current emission standards do not suggest that the regulated firms employ any specific
abatement equipment, and, therefore, look like pure "performance standards." Performance standards, in
contrast to specification or design standards, command only performance at a given level (e.g., SO x
emissions cannot exceed 1.2 lbs/MBtu) that must be achieved by the regulated firms, although the firms
may select the means utilized to attain the goal mandated.
66 Prior to 1987, the measurement of air quality changes was even more controversial. In Taiwan
Province and Kaohsiung City, the locations for conducting such an ambient measurement, in principle, had
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upheld the legality of this practice. 67 The court justified its decision in the
relevant case by noting that the regulatory agency had taken into account
these possible miscalculations by adjusting the original standards to
accommodate an adequate margin of error.68 Third, in the case of water
pollution, much to the chagrin of the regulatory agencies, current law allows
the regulated polluters to meet pollution standards simply by diluting waste
water before discharge.69
E. Enforcement Mechanisms
The United States CAA and CWA not only provide multiple
mechanisms of enforcement, but, in order to achieve a maximum degree of
enforcement, delegate the power of initiation to all of the parties involved.
In particular, while the states are assigned "primary responsibility," any
failure to enforce will result in a federal takeover. In case neither federal nor
state government takes action, private enforcement may be initiated under
the "citizen suits" clause.70 The federal government may also act against
to be outside the boundary of the polluting source being tested. Only when this was impossible could the
agency properly choose a location within three meters of the boundary as the measuring spot. See Air
Pollutants Emission Standards for Stationary Sources Applicable in Taiwan Province, § 7; Air Pollutants
Emission Standards for Stationary Sources Applicable in Kaohsiung City, § 7.
The rule was different in Taipei City. The measuring location chosen had to be located somewhere
between 5 meters inside the boundary and 15 meters outside the boundary of the polluting source to be
tested. See Air Pollutants Emission Standards for Stationary Sources Applicable in Taipei City, n.3.
The current Air Pollutants Emission Standards for Stationary Sources promulgated by the TEPA in
April 1992 have unified the practice by adopting the original rule applicable in the Taiwan Province. Air
Pollutants Emission Standards for Stationary Sources, § 6 (1992).
67 Administrative Court Decision No. 228 (1981) (Taiwan) [hereinafter ACD].
68 Id. The standard for smoke density in Taipei City was originally set at 350 mg/m3 . Given that
emissions contributed by other sources may be collected in an ambient concentration test, the Health
Administration, Executive Yuan, reset the standard to 500 mg/m3 . In addition, a test error of 10% is
allowed in practice; that is, only a test resulting in a concentration of more than 550 mg/m 3 subject the
offender to punishment. Manifestly, these facts show that all relevant factors were taken into account
when the control authority set up the maximum allowable concentration standards. The plaintiff's
argument is thus untenable.
The industry has suggested that ambient air testing around neighborhoods be completely abolished;
they believe that the only meaningful tests are those measured at the stacks. See, e.g., Wei, Opinions of the
Cement Industry on the Achievement of Current Air Pollutant Emission Standards, 7 INDus. POLLtUTION
CONTROL 15, 18 (1983).
69 To overcome this problem, the 1991 amendments added a new provision (§ 20) prohibiting
industrial or municipal sources from diluting their waste water without obtaining a permit in advance from
the controlling metropolitan or county government.
Similar problems existed in Japan, see GREASER, K FUJIKURA & A. MoRISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN JAPAN 18 (1989).
70 42 U.S.C. § 7604(1988 & Supp. 1991); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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the lawbreakers directly through the auspices of the EPA and individual
citizens. 71
Whenever the Administrator finds a SIP violator, he must notify the
state. If the state fails to act against the violator within thirty days after the
notice, the EPA may intervene and issue an order requiring compliance.
Alternatively, the EPA can bring civil actions, as any provision in a SIP
approved by the EPA is a federal regulation. 72 If the violations of a SIP
provision are so widespread that they appear to result from a failure by the
state, the Administrator must instruct the state to take corrective measures.
If this failure extends beyond the thirteenth day after the notice, the EPA
must give public notice of its findings and take over enforcement
responsibility until the state satisfies the Administrator that it vigorously will
enforce the SIP.73
As for the uniform federal emission standards, the EPA must delegate
enforcement authority if a state has developed adequate procedures for
implementing and enforcing these standards. 74 Even after delegation, how-
ever, the EPA still retains enforcement power.
In sum, the "creative federalism" embodied in the CAA and CWA has
made enforcement in the United States a shared responsibility of all levels of
government. As a matter of practice, the EPA normally takes cases that are
particularly complex or that a state has avoided for political reasons.75
Governmental enforcement of environmental regulations is supple-
mented by the availability of citizen suits, which are divided into two types.
The first type allows any person to commence civil action on his own behalf
against any person who is alleged to "be in violation of'76 an applicable
71 This multilayered structure of enforcement is sketched in Figure 1. (See Appendix).
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990); 40 C.F.R. § 52.23 (1987) (amended 1989).
73 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (1988) (amended 1990).
74 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991) and 7412(d)(1) (1988) (amended 1993). The
states may also enforce the monitoring/inspection requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(b)(1) (1988 & Supp.
1991). The enforcement of new motor vehicle emission standards, however, cannot be delegated to the
states.
75 R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: TIM CASE OFPTHE CLEAN AIR ACT 197 (1983).
The dual system of enforcement, however, does cause tension. Compare United States v. Louisiana-
Pacific Corp., 18 ERC 2020 (1982) (the EPA may prosecute under the Clean Water Act even in the event
of compliance with state NPDES schedules) and United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 745-46
(D. Del. 1981) ("a federal enforcement suit [can] be maintained despite the pendency of similar
proceedings in state court.") with United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980)
(collateral estoppel bars EPA from litigating issues resolved in state court proceeding).
76 There are ambiguities in the meaning of "alleged to be in violation." The Supreme Court in
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987) held that while
wholly past violations cannot serve as grounds for citizen suits, the plaintiff-citizen can allege a state of
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emission or effluent standard or limitation or an order issued with respect to
such standard or limitation.77 The other, as mentioned earlier, allows any
person to sue the Administrator for his failure to perform nondiscretionary
duties.78
In terms of procedure, the current United States enforcement system is
characterized by the gradual escalation of the process. A violator first is
given an administrative order (i.e., notice of the violation) in which the facts
of violation are stated and a date for final compliance is set (usually through
negotiation). Only if the violator fails to comply with the administrative
order will the agency impose administrative "noncompliance penalties"79 or
commence a civil action for injunctive relief or monetary penalties. 80
Criminal sanctions are reserved for the most recalcitrant and intentional
violators.81
Environmental violations in Taiwan usually consist of noncompliance
with regulatory standards, 82 emergency orders of the regulatory agencies,
83
either continuous or intermittent violation, and a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to
pollute in the future.
'n 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
Serving as a supplementary mechanism, a citizen suit can be brought only after sixty days have passed
after the notice of violation has been issued and the EPA or state has taken no action against the violator
during that sixty day period. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988 &
Supp. 1991).
78 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1991). It is
not quite clear which duties of the Administrator are nondiscretionary. Compare City of Seabrook v.
Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981) (the "principle of almost absolute discretion in initiating
enforeement action should apply with equal force to the decision to take the preliminary investigatory steps
that would provide the basis for enforcement action") with South Carolina Wildlife Federation v.
Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 134 (D.S.C. 1978) (the duty of the Administrator to issue a compliance order
under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) is nondiscretionary).
79 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
80 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
81 See Enforcement Today: An Interview with Thomas L Adams, Jr. (Assistant Administrator in
charge of EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring), 13(2) EPA J. 2-5 (Mar. 1987); Anne
Gorsuch, General Operating Procedures for Civil Enforcement Program, 13 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 78 (1982).
From 1983 to 1990, only 26 prosecutions under the CAA and 184 prosecutions under the CWA
(including Safe Drinking Water Act as well as Refuse Act) have been brought by the Department of
Justice. See HUTCHINs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME SECTION, ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL STATIsTIcs FY 83 THROUGH FY 90, MEMO (Feb. 2, 1991), reprinted in INNOVATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POuCY 78 (tbl. 4.1) (T. Tietenberg ed., 1992). The CWA provides for criminal sanctions
when a discharge is "willful" or "negligent," while under the CAA a violation must be "knowing" in order
to be criminal. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988 & Supp. 1991); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
8 See, e.g., APCA, art. 36 (Taiwan) (violations of emission standards); WPCA, art. 38 (Taiwan)
(violations of effluent standards); Noise Control Act, art. 15 (Taiwan) (noise regulatory standards).
83 APCA, art. 8, § 1 (Taiwan) prescribes:
Upon receipt of evidence that the air quality might have seriously deteriorated because of
sudden changes in meteorological conditions or other causes, the regulatory agencies and the
operators of public and private places shall take emergency preventive measures. If necessary,
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or monitoring- or inspection-related requirements.8 4 The sanctions available
for violations include administrative fines, suspension of operation, shut
down, and criminal penalties.8 5
Compared to their United States counterparts, the ROC's enforcement
mechanisms clearly are different. First, while a regulatory agency in Taiwan
can issue an immediate order of suspension, a United States regulatory
iagency first must bring a civil action for a permanent or temporary
injunction. This difference can be attributed to the lack of a due process
requirement in the ROC Constitution.86 A pragmatic institutional remedy
would be to adopt a formal hearing procedure for the imposition of such
sanctions in the forthcoming administrative procedure act.
Second, while the Taiwanese "continuous daily fines" and the United
States "non-compliance penalties" both are imposed by the regulatory
agencies (without the necessity of a lawsuit), the United States approach is
more effective because it deprives polluters of the economic profits reaped
the regulatory agencies may issue air quality deterioration warnings and may prohibit or
restrain the uses of modes of transportation or the emission of air pollutants in public and
private places. [emphasis added].
A stationary source in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of between NT$ 100,000 and
NT$ 1,000,000; if the violation is found to be serious, the source may be ordered to suspend operation
temporarily. APCA, art 34, § 1 (Taiwan).
Article 20 of the APCA provides:
The operator of a stationary source which significantly increases its emission of air pollutants
due to an accident shall take emergency responsive measures and report to the local regulatory
agency within one hour.
The regulatory agencies confronted with the situation of Section I of this Article may order
the polluting source[s] to take necessary measures and even to suspend its operation.
[emphasis added].
A source in violation shall be punished by a fine of between NT$ 100,000 and NT$ 1,000,000; if the
violation is found to be serious, the regulatory agencies may order the source to suspend operation
temporarily, or may even revoke its permit of operation or suspend operation indefinitely. APCA, art. 40
(Taiwan).
The author suggests that these two above-cited articles be revised into one article modeled after
Section 303(a) of the United States CAA (42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991)).
84 See, e.g., APCA, art. 36 (Taiwan) (failure to install automatic monitoring equipment and to
submit a self-certification report to the TEPA periodically, as required by art. 12), APCA, art. 30 (Taiwan)
(false representation).
85 See, e.g., APCA, arts. 29-33 (Taiwan); WPCA, arts. 32-37 (Taiwan). These penalties were added
by the amendments of 1992 and 1991. The practice of having criminal penalties scattered in each
environmental statute is different from the German model which collects all environmental crimes together
as a chapter (Straftaten gegen die Umwelt) in the Criminal Code. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] ch. 28.
86 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "No person shall.., be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ... The first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains similar provisions applicable to States.
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by delaying or avoiding compliance with pollution control requirements. 87
On the other hand, Taiwanese regulatory agencies only can punish a
recalcitrant violator by a fine of the maximum amount on a continuous daily
basis.88 If the maximum fine actually is less than the economic profits
reaped by noncompliance, then the polluter has no economic incentive to
comply. The United States civil penalties may be worthy of adoption by
Taiwan as a middle ground sanction, so that the rationality of environmental
sanctions can be improved without touching the thorny problem of
distinguishing criminal wrongs or illegalities from administrative wrongs or
illegalities.89
Third, the gradual escalation of enforcement in Taiwan is controlled
by legislative command rather than subject to the discretion of the
administrative agency. Fourth, the government purchases are not (but
should be) used seriously as another available sanction against
environmental violations.90
87 The penalties assessed by the Administrator shall be "no less than the economic value which a
delay in compliance . . . may have for the owner of such source, including . . . the capital costs of
compliance .... operation and maintenance costs .... and any additional economic value, which such a
delay may have for the owner or operator of such source... " 42 U.S.C. § 7420(d)(2)(A) (1988).
To meet the Due Process requirements, the Administrator can only determine the amounts of
penalties through formal administrative adjudication procedures. 42 U.S.C. § 7420(b)(5) (1988).
88 According to the Highlights promulgated by the TEPA for guiding the imposition of sanctions
under the APCA, a plant found still in violation, after expiration of the designated period for improvement,
shall be punished by a fine of the maximum amount on a continuous daily basis until the plant suspends
operation. See TEPA PuB. NOTICE 40,319 (Air) (Nov. 6, 1990) (in TEPA REGISTER No. 36 (Dec. 1990)).
The earlier version of the Highlights promulgated by the Health Administration in 1984 even
provided exact increments for each additional violation. For example, the first violation found shall be
subject to a fine of NT$ 30,000 and the second, a fine of NT$ 60,000, and so forth. See TEPA,
COMPMATION OF ENvIRONmENTAL LAWS AND REGULATONS H- 16 (1989).
89 It is the WPCA Amendments of 1991 and the APCA Amendments of 1992 that introduced
criminal sanctions into the environmental laws. However, the lack of social or moral culpability in some of
the environmental crimes has been questioned.
It should be noted that some civil penalties for environmental violations in the United States can be
imposed by an administrative agency through formal hearings, see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (1988); 15
U.S.C. § 2615 (1988), while others can be imposed only by courts, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988)
(amended 1990); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988) (amended 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1988).
90 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1988) (amended 1990); 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988). For years the ROC has
adopted regulations requiring the administrative agencies of the central government to purchase "clean
vehicles." See Implementation Highlights for All Levels of Government to Purchase Low-Polluting and
Energy-Saving Vehicles, in TEPA, COMPILATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS H-137
(1992). However, these regulations have not been enforced seriously. In light of the ambitious scale of the
"Six Year National Construction Project" (the total government purchase is estimated to reach NT$ 8,200
Billion, or U.S. $ 328 billion), however, this sanction could become very effective.
S-109
PACIIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
F. Jurisdiction of Central and Local Governments
A more effective division of labor among the various Taiwanese
levels of government for environmental regulations is needed. Generally
speaking, China has been united since the Chin Dynasty (B.C. 246-B.C.
207), and yet for such a huge country, the relationship between the central
government and local governments has been a recurring political issue
throughout history. The ROC Constitution attempts to address this problem
by setting some guidelines that divide all legislative subject matters into four
categories: (1) those that shall be legislated and executed by the central
government; 91 (2) those that shall be legislated by the central government,
but can be delegated to the provincial or county governments for
execution;92 (3) those that shall be legislated by the provincial government,
but can be delegated to county governments for execution; 93 and (4) those
that shall be legislated and executed by county governments. 94 Any matter
not enumerated in these four categories falls within the jurisdiction of the
central government if national in nature, the provincial government if
regional in nature, or the county if local in nature.95
Environmental protection is, however, not a matter enumerated in any
of the four above-cited provisions, and its nature is so flexible that all levels
of government can play a role in shaping environmental laws and policies.
The challenge, therefore, is to pursue an efficient division of labor among
the various levels of government.
So far, this issue has not received consideration. While recent amend-
ments of the APCA and WPCA do allow the provincial and county govern-
ments to set up more stringent standards, 96 these "local superiorities" can be
realized only after overcoming various procedural hurdles.97 In addition, the
current legal allocation of enforcement responsibility among the various
91 These include foreign affairs, national defense, judicial system, international trade policy,
designation of national, provincial, and county taxes. See XIANFA, art. 107 (PRC) (Constitution).
92 These include general guidelines for provincial and county self-governance, educational system,
eminent domain, and police system. Id. art. 108.
93 These include issues concerning education, public health, and transportation within a province.
Id. art. 109.
94 These include issues concerning education, public health, and transportation within a county. Id.
art. 110.
95 The Legislative Yuan of the central government shall decide any dispute arising thereon. Id. art.
111.
96 See, e.g., APCA art.5, § 2 (air quality standards), art. 11, § 2 (emission standards) (Taiwan);
WPCA art.7, § 2 (effluent standards), art. 9 (water quality based effluent limits) (Taiwan). See supra note
43.
97 See supra note 44.
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levels of government is puzzling. 98 It seems that the central government has
become increasingly involved in taking actions against major polluters. 99
G. Scarcity of Environmental Litigation
The primitive state of development of Taiwanese environmental law is
evidenced by the existence of so few decisions by the Administrative Court
concerning the APCA and WPCA. 1°° Due to the lack of a comprehensive
judicial review of administrative decisions, almost all environmental litiga-
tions have focused on the facts of enforcement. The fact that the courts have
not been able to participate in environmental decisionmaking is also a
marked departure from the United States experience.101
The tenor of the most important judicial decisions can be summarized
in the following manner. First, the administrative agency that imposes sanc-
98 Article 48 of the APCA prescribes that, except as otherwise provided in the Act, all sanctions
taken by the central government shall be imposed by the TEPA; those taken by the provincial government
shall be imposed by the Bureau of Environmental Protection; those taken by municipal governments shall
be imposed by the Bureau of Environmental Protection; and those taken by a county shall be imposed by
its government. APCA, art. 48 ITaiwan]. Article 56 of the WPCA has similar provisions, but does not
mention the central government.
99 Former TEPA Administrator Jaw Shau-Kong criticized the slothful enforcement of local
governments and established a special task force consisting of 90 members for enforcing against the
targeted major polluters. See CHINA NEWS, Jan. 3, 1992, at 5.
100 The breakdown of decisions concerning air and water pollution control rendered by the
Administrative Court may be illustrated as follows:
% of Total Result of Decision
Number of Decisions Appeal Rejected Decision Reversed
Year Cases Rendered % (number) % (number)
1981 6 0.43% 100% (6) 0% (0)
1982 10 0.61% 100% (10) 0% (0)
1983 12 0.69% 91.67% (11) 8.33% (1)
1984 15 0.88% 100% (15) 0% (0)
1985 59 2.80% 74.75% (49) 15.25% (10)
1986 36 1A6% 97.22% (35) 2.78% (1)
1987 52 2.30% 94.23% (49) 5.77% (3)
1988 118 5.13% 61.61% (69) 38.39% (43)*
1989 313 11.54% 36.10% (113) 63.90% (200)t
Source: JUDICIAL YUAN, ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL CASES, 1981, at 395 & 407 (June 1983); Id., 1983,
at 434,438, 447, 451 (June 1984); Id., 1984, at 500, 504 (June, 1985); Id., 1985, at 475 (1986); Id., 1986,
at 491,496 (June, 1987); Id., 1988, at 471,478,486,491 (1989); Id., 1989, at 423,435 (1990).
* The reason for this sudden rise of success rate was not indicated in the ANALYSIS.
t See infra note 111 for the reason.
101 See generally LErrIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982); R.
MELNiCK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN Am Acr (1983).
S-111
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
tions bears the burden of proof.1°2 Neither the presence of a representative
from the inspected plant nor its consent is required for conducting a source
test or measurement that usually forms a part of the proof.10 3
Second, the operators of a source discharging pollutants in excess of
the applicable standards should be fined. The agency is not required either
to give prior notice to the offender1' 4 or prove damage to the public.105  The
malfunction of control equipment due to operator negligence is not a legal
excuse for violations and will not result in the avoidance of liability.106
Third, the administrative fines under the WPCA are administrative
penalties and do not require proof of the elements of intent or negligence.107
As long as the fine imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum, a
regulatory agency enjoys full discretion in assessing the amount without
regard to the guidelines established by the regulatory agency.108
Fourth, the invocation by an environmental regulatory agency and a
national park administrative agency of different statutes 09  to punish a
particular stationary source (a power plant) for the same violation
(discharging waste water not in compliance with the applicable effluent stan-
dards) does not constitute a violation of res judicata. The reason is that the
legal interests protected in the statutes involved are sharply different."10
102 See, e.g., ACD No. 797 (1986) (Taiwan). However, a plaintiff who asserts that a sample test
conducted by the control authority produced incorrect results bears the burden of proof. ACD No. 1087
(1983) (Taiwan).
103 See, e.g., ACD No. 39 (1985) (Taiwan); ACD No. 1858 (1987) (Taiwan); ACD No. 1590
(1988) (Taiwan). APCA art. 21 and WPCA art. 25 expressly grant the representatives of environmental
agencies the right of access to the plants for inspection. So far, no controversy similar to a United States
Fourth Amendment guarantee (see, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)) has occurred in Taiwan.
104 See, e.g., ACD No. 2659 (1989) (Taiwan).
105 See, e.g., ACD No. 1364 (1990) (Taiwan); ACD No. 1003 (1985) (Taiwan).
106 See, e.g., ACD No. 559 (1985) (Taiwan).
107 See, e.g., ACD No. 597 (1985) (Taiwan); ACD No. 1285 (1987) (Taiwan). It should be noted
that such opinions have been revised by Interpretation No. 275 of the Council of Grand Justices (March 8,
1991): "To be subject to administrative penalties, one must have, at least, negligence. When a statute
imposes administrative penalties merely for violating prohibitions or obligations of action without
requiring occurrence of damage or danger, the violator is assumed to be negligent."
108 See ACD No. 1235 (1990) (Taiwan).
109 See WPCA art. 9, § 1 (1983) (Taiwan); National Parks Act art.5, § 3, art. 25 (1972) (Taiwan)
(behavior polluting either air or water quality is prohibited in a national park).
110 ACD No. 19 (1989) (Taiwan). One can easily challenge this decision by questioning whether
the interests protected in the statutes involved are really "sharply different."
No statutes deal with the problem of concurrent administrative sanctions. A draft of the
Administrative Wrongs Punishment Act (art. 23) proposed by scholars prescribes that a violator shall be
subject to the statute that has the higher maximum administrative penalties, and the penalties assessed shall
not be lower than the lowest minimum penalties prescribed in the statutes which has the lower maximum
penalties. See Y. LIAU, A STUDY ON THE PUNISHMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE WRONGS 356 (1990).
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Fifth, the period set for final compliance for a noncomplying source
must be feasible. That means it must be judged by general experience to be
sufficient to make the required improvements.11 '
IV. THE POLICY OF SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Since its inception, the ROC government has possessed limited,
resources for the enforcement of pollution control. Selective enforcement of
regulations, therefore, has been one of the hallmarks of Taiwan's environ-
mental law. This policy is demonstrated in several ways.
A. Emphasis on the Control of State Enterprises
For several reasons, the Taiwanese government for many years has
focused on the pollution control of state enterprises. First, because the
government directly and substantially influences the management of state
enterprises, 112 these entities made an obvious choice to be the first
candidates for control. Second, in terms of size, state enterprises are
generally giant corporations, which are more financially able to invest in
pollution control. Third, state enterprises are major pollution
contributors.'13 Fourth, successful control of state enterprises may serve as
111 See, e.g., ACD No. 1501 (1989) (Taiwan); ACD No. 1654 (1989) (Taiwan). One
Administrative Court revoked 200 agency decisions in 1989 for the unfeasibility of the final compliance
period. See supra note 100.
However, it should be noted that these decisions may no longer be applicable because Article 55 of
the newly revised WPCA clearly prescribes that the time period specified under the Act for improvement
cannot exceed 90 days.
112 Statistics show that there were altogether 691 inspectors responsible for monitoring 95,327
registered factories and 12,574,943 mobile sources on Taiwan in 1991. See TEPA YEARBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS, TAIwAN AREA, REPUBluC OF CHINA 240-41 (Table 5-6), 278-79 (Tables 6-6,
6-7) (1992).
The annual budget of TEPA for the fiscal year of 1991 was NT$ 4.091 billion, amounting to 0.49%
of the annual budget of the central government (NT$ 827.19 billion), or 0.08% of the GNP of the same
year (NT$ 4821.2 billion). Id. at 220, 258. In contrast, the expenditures for pollution abatement and
control by the United States federal government over the period 1972 to 1986 amounted to 0.38% of the
total GNP for the same period. See TANG, supra note I. at 424 (Table 2-13) for details.
The poor collection record of administrative fines provides another indication of the government's
ineffectiveness in law enforcement. According to the TEPA, only one-fourth (about NT$ 300 million) of
the fines assesed in 1990 were actually paid; around 56% (about NT$ 593 million) of the fines assessed in
1991 were collected. See CENTRAL DAILY NEws, Oct. 8, 1991, at 11; CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7,
1992, at 1. The TEPA planned to increase the ratio to 75% within 5 years. See TEPA, THE FIVE YEAR
GOALS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEION 157 (1992).
113 The State Enterprises Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for
supervising the operation of all state enterprises. A statistical study conducted by the TEPA shows the
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a model for private enterprises, persuading the private enterprises, in turn, to
discharge voluntarily their social duties. 1 4  A famous 1991 case illustrating
this strategy involved the Chung Hsing Paper Co., an enterprise run by the
Taiwan Provincial government that supplied forty-six percent of domestic
printing media paper. The TEPA ordered Chung Hsing to suspend
production until it complied with the applicable effluent standards set by the
Agency. In a cabinet meeting, Premier Hau stressed that government-run
enterprises must take the lead in abiding by environmental laws.115
B. Emphasis on Major Polluting Industries
Since 1984, the government has launched a series of abatement
campaigns against selected industries. The industries selected for air pollu-
tion control enforcement include steel manufacturing, cement
manufacturing, coke ovens, petrochemicals, non-iron metals, paper and pulp,
and man-made fabric.116  With respect to water pollution, the government
established a special program in 1984 aimed at controlling all discharges of
industries that used fermenting processes (primarily the provincial
government-run enterprises). Since 1986, the control program has been
expanded to cover seventy-two major public enterprises and seventy-two
major private enterprises.11 7  In 1987 and 1989, the program was further
extended to cover another 341 governmental and 1178 private industrial
plants.11
8
total investment in pollution control by all state enterprises in the 1992 budget year reached a peak of NT$
193 billion, a 7.69% increase over 1991. See EcONoMics DAILY, April 4, 1992, at 7.
114 For example, in 1985 emissions from power generators amounted to 24.78%, 24.56% and
23.65% of the total TSP, SOX, and NOx emissions, respectively. Due to the existence of a state monopoly,
only one firm is in the power generating industry, Tai Power. A similar situation exists in the oil refining
industry (i.e., China Petroleum Co.). See TANG, supra note 1, at 332, 475-77 (Tables 6-15, 6-16, 6-17) for
details.
115 For example, the TEPA listed 28 state plants, including those of Tai Power, China Petroleum,
Taiwan Fertilizer, and Taiwan Sugar as first priority target plants for air pollution abatement. By August
1989, 22 of these 28 plants had achieved the regulatory goals. THE TEPA WORK BRIEFING 113 (Aug.
1989).
As to water pollution combat, 72 state enterprise plants have been targeted. By August 1989, 63 of
them had achieved the regulatory goals. Id. at 128.
116 In Taiwan Province, an inventory of 1,200 plants was conducted. These plants were classified
into three classes. Plants of the First Class, including 19 public plants and 203 private plants, are subject to
inspection once a month. As of December 1987, 110 of the 222 plants had achieved the improvements
required. See.K. LEE, A STUDY ON THE MAKING OFAIRPOLLUTION CONTROL POLICY 13-14 (1988).
117 As of August 1989, 63 of the 72 targeted public enterprises and 53 of the 72 targeted private
enterprises had achieved the improvements required. See TH TEPA WORK BRIEFING 128 (1989).
118 In addition to these controls on industrial effluent, the government also has focused on livestock
farms. For the district of Taiwan Province, livestock production (mainly pigs) is the second largest water
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In 1987, as an initial step for treating heavily polluted rivers, the
government inaugurated a comprehensive project for cleaning the Tam-Sui
River system. The first stage of this process, however, which lasted three
years has turned out to be a government failure." 9 The most commonly
cited explanation for this failure is the government's difficulty in taking land
under eminent domain for sewage treatment plants and for other pollution
control facilities. The difficulties also have been the partial result of poor
cooperation among various levels of government, 120 or even among various
agencies of the same government. The Tam-sui River essentially is a
microcosm of Taiwan's environmental problems. Many Taiwanese citizens
involved consider the present compensation system for eminent domain
unfair because compensation is calculated based upon the publicized land
prices, which are much lower than their market counterparts. 121 In addition,
the lack of an integrated agency responsible for cleaning up the Tam-sui
River is a further obstacle to reaching an effective solution.
122
pollution source; it results in 25% of the total BODS produced. See TEPA, ROC TAIWAN AREA
ENVIRONMENTAL STAIsTICS 91, Table 4-4-4 (1991). It is generally agreed that the BODS produced by
pig feces are several times more potent than those from human feces.
119 The Executive Yuan (Cabinet) decided to extend the construction period by two years until
October 1993 and to increase the original budget by NT$ 40.6 billion. See CINA NEws, Oct. 8, 1991, at
14.
A good example in the United States is "below-cost timber sales," in which the costs of harvesting the
timber on public lands exceed the revenues from the timber sales. See Sedjo, Forest Resource
Management and the Environment: the Role of Economic Incentives, in OECD, RENEWABLE NATURAL
RESOURCES: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT 76 (1989).
The reason why governments "fail" in their management regulation of public goods is explained best
in terms of Public Choice Theory. Public Choice, sometimes referred to as the economic theory of
legislation, is commonly defined as a theory of politics derived from the assumption that all political
participants are rational, egotistic utility maximizers; they are motivated solely by the desire to maximize
their self-interests, such as re-election and budget aggrandizement. Because the incentives in public
management are inherently flawed and distorted, government failures are inevitable. See generally Robert
D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988); D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
120 The cleanup became even more troublesome after 1990 when the opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) won the election for the Talpei County magistrate. DPP Magistrate Yio Ching
has several times publicly criticized the feasibility of the project. In response, TEPA Administrator Jaw
urged that "all of the government agencies working on the project put the cleanup first, and politics
second." See Mindich, Intractable River Pollution, 41(10) FREE CHINA REVIEW 4, at 16 (Oct. 1991).
121 Indeed, land appropriation has become a thorny problem for all public construction projects.
The construction of the second northern highway has also lagged behind schedule due to eminent domain
disputes.
122 According to Jaw Shau-kong, TEPA's Administrator, his agency is responsible for coordinating
the Tam-sui project, while local governments are to carry out the project. See Mindich, supra note 120, at
6. It is reported that Premier Hau has instructed the Taipei Municipal Government to establish a new
agency to prepare for the overall administration of Tam-sui basin. See UNrrED DAILY NEws, Aug. 2, 1992.
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C. Sulphur and Lead in Gas Phasedown
Because a state enterprise, the China Petroleum Corporation (CPC),
enjoys a monopoly over domestic oil, the Taiwanese government can effec-
tively reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by requiring a lower sulphur content
in the gas for sale. Beginning on July 1, 1986, and again on July 1, 1990,
the CPC lowered the sulphur content in its gas to no more than two percent
and one and one-half percent, respectively. The CPC plans to make a further
reduction to less than one percent after July 1, 1993.123 Since June 1, 1986,
in another effort to reduce lead emissions, the CPC has marketed unleaded
gas. 124 However, the use of unleaded gas as a pollution control device has
proven unsuccessful, because the price of unleaded gas has been higher than
that of leaded gas125 and therefore has served as an adverse incentive for
consumers. This is yet another illustration of poor coordination among the
agencies and policies in the ROC.
D. Limiting Development of Heavy Pollution Industries
The government prohibition of openly burning waste electric cables to
recover heavy metals presents a good example of Taiwanese governmental
limits on heavy pollution industries. Studies have shown that this now
prohibited process releases hazardous gases, including PCBs and dioxin.
Since a great portion of the raw materials used in this business is
Another source reported that the Ministry of Interior is considering a suggestion received by the
central government to establish several "basin administration bureaus" for major rivers. See UNITED
DAILYNEws, Nov. 19, 1992.
123 See TEPA, IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, at 5 (approved by the
Executive Yuan on Jan. 27, 1987).
The TEPA has announced that fuel with a sulfur content of more than 1.5% is the material that would
easily cause air pollution. Since July 1, 1990 no one can sell or use this fuel without obtaining a permit.
See TEPA AND MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS JOINT PUBLIC NOTICE No. 07,299 (Mar. 9, 1992),
reprinted in TEPA REGISTER, No. 52, at 7 (Apr. 1992) (replacing the Joint Public Notice No. 18,906 (June
5, 1990) that appeared in TEPA REGISTER, No. 30, at 46 (June 1990)).
124 The TEPA plans to decree that after July 1993, the amount of lead in leaded fuel should be
decreased from 0.12 grams per litre to 0.08 grams, and after July 1997 decreased further to 0.026 grams.
The CPC also expects to sell only unleaded fuel by 2001. See CHINA NEWS, Mar. 26, 1992, at 3.
125 China Petroleum insisted that this practice is necessary for recovering its purification
investments. After severe criticism by the public, China Petroleum lowered the sale price of unleaded gas
equal to that of leaded gas. See MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS NEWSRELEASE (Feb. 13, 1992). It
should be noted, however, that because of the state monopoly, the CPC is the only supply source of
gasoline in Taiwan.
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imported, 126 the government approached the problem by regulating their
importation. In 1983, the waste cables first were classified into four classes:
A, B1 , B2, and B3. Cables of class B3 are completely banned from
importation, while those of classes Bi and B2 can be imported only with a
permit obtained in advance. 127  As a second step, the Bureau of
Environmental Protection, Department of Health (the predecessor of the
TEPA) promulgated the Highlights for Setting Quotas for the Importation of
Classified Waste Cables128 in July 1985 to specify the import quota.
Additionally, two special industrial districts, Da-Fa and Wan-Li, were set up
in order to concentrate the waste disposal of these cables. Starting in
.September 1988, the original import quota was cut in half;129 and in 1989
the TEPA required that all accumulated waste cables in the two districts be
disposed of by specific deadlines or the import quota would again be cut in
half.130 A complete ban on importing waste cables finally became effective
on January 1, 1993.131
In the beginning, many plants operating on a very small scale could
not afford pollution control expenses and, quite understandably, refused to
move into these special industrial districts. Since the burning activities are
highly mobile, many plant operators have adopted the tactics of guerrilla
warfare and simply bum the cables at night and hide in the daytime.
132
Reports indicate, however, that such violations have been reduced
dramatically with the progressive implementation of control programs.
133
126 Besides some 50,000 metric tons of electric cables from the domestic ship industry, about
360,000 metric tons are imported from the United States and Japan every year. See DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, WASTE CABLES POLLUTION CONTROL REPORT 1-5 (1987).
127 See BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS, GUIDELINES FOR
CLASSIFYING WASTECABLES (OcL 1983).
128 See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, PUBLIC NOTICE (ENVIRONMENT) No. 551197 (Sept. 6, 1985),
reprinted in BUREAU OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, COMPILATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 565 (1987).
129 TEPA PUBLIC NOTICE (WASTE) No. 17205 (Sept. 5, 1988), reprinted in TEPA, COMPILATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS XII-163 (1989).
130 See TEPA, COMPILATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS V-96 to V-98 (1992).
131 See BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS, TRADE (81) No. 20934
(Dec. 14, 1992).
132 See BUREAU OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REPORT ON
POLLUTION CONTROL OF WASTED ELECTRIC CABLES (1987).
133 See TEPA REGISTER No. 19 (July 1989), at 507.
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E. Selective Enforcement Against Existing Sources
In order to protect their own re-election prospects, popularly elected
mayors and county magistrates are disinclined to strictly enforce laws
against existing sources. 13 Conversely, these officials are inclined to side
with residents in preventing new sources from establishing local sites.135
The environmental enforcement commitments may vary greatly in various
administrative areas. 136  The practice by local politicians of lenient and
selective enforcement against existing sources coupled with a strong
disinclination towards new sources may lead to an unique Taiwanese "new
source bias."
V. Misguided Experiments with Economic Instruments
Economists tend to view environmental pollution as an economic
problem.1 37  They believe that pollution is the result of a market failure.
138
Specifically, private markets may provide inadequate environmental
protection when environmental values are externalities inadequately
reflected in the prices consumers pay for goods and services, or when
environmental values are public goods from which all individuals benefit but
in which no single individual has an adequate incentive to invest. To correct
134 See CHINA NEws, July 26, 1991, for a complaint by TEPA Administrator Jaw about the spotty
enforcement by local governments.
135 In the past few years, local residents have increasingly voiced opposition against large-scale and
usually important investment plans. For example, plans for the fifth naphtha cracking plant of China
Petroleum and the sixth naphtha plant of Formosa Plastics were seriously contested by local residents.
136 It is evident that various states in the United States have enforced environmental laws to
different degrees of stringency. See CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL, W. HARRINGTON & W. VAUGHAN, ENFORCING
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 40-41, table 2-7 (1986).
137 See, e.g., Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, reprinted in
MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED READINGS 498 (Mansfield ed., 2d ed. 1975) ("We are going to make very
little real progress in solving the problem of pollution until we recognize it for what, primarily, it is: an
economic problem, which must be understood in economic terms.") See generally, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION,
PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968).
138 Bator, Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 31 (1958). For a criticism of the confusion
of this concept, see Alan Randall, The Problem of Market Failure, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 131 (1983).
A market in this context should be understood as an arrangement in which people pay for the things
they do that affect others. Except when damage suits can successfully be brought to recover for the injury,
these environmental effects are outside the pricing system. However, serious institutional barriers prevent
tort litigation from being an effective tool for recovering environmental damages. For a discussion of these
barriers and the need of an administrative compensation scheme, see, e.g., Developments in the Law: Toxic
Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1602-30 (1986); Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of
Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim
Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1983).
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this market failure, economists would require private decision makers to
internalize the externalities through governmental intervention. In general,
four means of intervention are available: regulations, subsidies, pollution
fees, and transferable discharge permits (TDP).139
In remedying these market failures, governments (including the
Republic of China and the United States) 14° traditionally have employed
command-and-control regulations that rely on uniform, inflexible,
technology-based standards coupled with monitoring and sanctions.
However, this type of regulatory system has been severely criticized by
many141  as being cost-ineffective, 142  inflexible, and as discouraging
innovation and investment.
143
Another form of governmental intervention is to subsidize private
activities that produce collective goods or to pay firms directly to supply the
goods in question. 144 For example, the government could subsidize the
expenditures necessary for installing abatement equipment for removing
sulphur from stack gases, or it simply could pay pollution sources for each
increment of improved air quality resulting from pollution control.
139 Liability rules may be regarded as the fifth approach in controlling externalities. See generally
A. Mitchell Polinksy, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability
Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979). Under the liability rule, the polluter is
obliged to pay the victim compensation for damages suffered. The amount of damages is set by a
collective body, usually a court, and need not reflect what the entitled party would have been willing to
accept or the actual reduction in the value of his entitlement. Some commentators believe that an
appropriately defined strict liability approach has lower deadweight costs and information costs compared
to quantity regulations and pollution charges or taxes. See, e.g., Michelle J. White & Donald Wittman, A
Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules Under Imperfect Information, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
413 (1983). Nonetheless, litigation has commonly proved to be an ineffective way of controlling pollution.
See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRiER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 255-324 (2d ed.
1978).
140 The U.S. has long relied on what Professor James Krier has called "The Great American
Regulatory Tradition" to solve social problems, especially during a crisis. See James E. Krier, The
Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429, 461-62 (1970-
71). See also Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189
(1986).
141 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); THOMAS H. TmTENBERG,
EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985); Robert W. Crandall, supra
note 61; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); ALLEN V.
KNESSE AND BLAIR T. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND
INsTrrtTIoNS (1968).
142 For example, it has resulted in unnecessary and high compliance costs.
143 See TANG, supra note 1, at 93-140 for a detailed summary.
144 This approach is also known as "polluter bribes." See generally Talbot Page, Failure of Bribes
and Standards for Pollution Abatement, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 677 (1973).
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A "pollution fee" 145 can be attached to each unit of emissions to
induce the emitter to internalize the social costs imposed by its emission.
Each emitter reduces emissions to the point that its costs of control become
as expensive as paying the fee. This point will vary for each emitter, but the
aggregate emissions reduction will correspond to the size of the fee
exacted. 46 Under this system, in contrast to subsidization, money flows in
the opposite direction: from the polluters to the government.
A transferable discharge permits (TDP)147 system attempts to solve
the externality problem by redefining private property rights in terms of
148environmental media. Under this approach, the government, in consid-
eration of the assimilative capacity of the environment, first imposes a
constraint on the total quantity of pollutant discharged and then issues
permits or allowances' 49 adding up to that total. Once issued, the permits
are tradable among polluters as a property right. The price of these permits
is set by market forces, as are the costs of alternatives to pollution (e.g.,
pollution control equipment). A TDP system represents a blend of
regulations and charges. 150  On the one hand, to the extent that the amount
of permits to be issued (representing the total amount of pollution of a
particular pollutant) in a given airshed or water basin is determined by the
agency and the individual permit specifies an emission standard, the TDP
system possesses the directness of a standard control system. On the other
hand, because the redistribution of permits after the initial issuance is taken
care of by the market, the TDP system embraces the flexibility of allocating
the control responsibility embodied in a charge system.
The subsidies, pollution charges, and transferable discharge permits
are all intended to correct the market failure problem by providing or
creating economic incentives for individual polluting sources to control
pollution. Thus, they are grouped commonly under the title of economic
incentives or economic instruments (E/I).
145 See, e.g., DALES, supra note 137, at 81-82. The term "pollution fee" is equivalent to
"emission/effluent charges" or "emission/effluent taxes."
146 See STmWART& KRMR, supra note 139, at 572, for a further graphic illustration of this point.
147 This system is also known as "marketable permits" or "tradeable allowances."
148 Related to the nonexclusive feature of public goods, the source of an externality can be found in
the absence of well-defined property rights. This implies that the distortions resulting from an externality,
at least in some cases, can be eliminated from an appropriate redefinition of ownership rights. BAUMOL &
OATES, supra note 137, at 26.
149 E.g., 1,000 kg/day of TSS.
150 Thomas H. Tietenberg, The Design of Property Rights for Air-Pollution Control, 22 PUB. POL'Y
275,278 (1974).
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Since it generally has been agreed that subsidies are not an effective
means for environmental protection, even though they are widely utilized in
Taiwan, 151 they will not be discussed here. What follows is a brief survey of
the programs that employ market-based mechanisms as tools for implement-
ing environmental policy.
First, a few words to clarify the title of this section. On the one hand,
the term "experiments" suggests that current applications of economic
instruments to date have been limited in number and scope, and often serve
as tests for wider applications in the future. This is the case in Taiwan at this
moment. In spite of these limitations, one should be aware that, in fact,
economic instruments have been applied quite successfully in Europe 152 and
the United States 153 for years to redress various environmental problems.
On the other hand, the title suggests that the author believes that the
programs to be discussed below have deviated from the correct use of E/I.
To see why these experiments are misguided, one has to acquire some
understanding of Taiwan's basic environmental policy.
A. Polluter-Pays-Principle (PPP) and Economic Instruments
The guidelines for environmental protection, the Environmental
Protection Policy Outline for the Current Stage (the Outline), was adopted at
the Executive Yuan Cabinet meeting of September 24, 1987. The Outline
contained three chapters and consisted of fifty-three articles. Chapter II
announced the basic strategies. 54 It seems clear by now that the Outline
151 See W. CHEN, 6 EVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF THE STATUTE FOR
ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVEMENT. ENCOURAGEMENT OF POLLUTION CONTROL (1987); TANG, supra note
1, at 115-128, 362-367 for details.
152 See, e.g., OECD, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENT (1989);
BLAIR T. BOWER, R. BARRER, J. KUHNER AND C. RUSSELL, INCENTIVES IN WATER QUAtITY
MANAGEMENT, FRANCE AND RUHR AREA (1981).
153 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Current Experiments with Economic Instruments in
Environmental Policy, Paper delivered at the Soviet-American Conference on "Economic Instruments for
Environmental Protection: From Theory to Practice" (Nov. 12-14, 1989); David W. Hoskins, Note, Acid
Rain, Emissions Trading and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 329 (1990);
Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions
Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989).
154 The following deserve special attention:
Art. 2 For the nation's long term interests, environmental protection and economic
development shall be given the same attention. During the process of economic development,
if there are significant adverse impacts on the environment, environmental protection shall
receive priority of consideration.
Art. 3 The people and industry share the responsibility of environmental protection with the
government.
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embraces the Polluter-Pays-Principle (PPP) mainly, if not solely, for revenue
raising purposes. However, the problem is that the PPP is not necessarily
consistent with E/I. The PPP has been defined generally as: The polluter
should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution, which measures have
been decided upon by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in
an "acceptable state."155  On the one hand, E/Is that do not result in the
polluter bearing the full costs of pollution control measures would be
inconsistent with the PPP. On the other hand, E/Is have been applied in
hopes of achieving some "incentive impact," that is, using the E/I as an
incentive for the target group to bring positive changes to reach the environ-
mental objective. Therefore, the better the correlation between the volume
and hazardousness of discharge and the amount or size of payment, the
better the compatibility between the PPP and E/I. 156  Whenever revenue
raising becomes the major purpose, prima facie economic incentive-based
instruments will be distorted and will lose their originally expected incentive
impact.
B. Trash Disposal Fees
Based on the delegation mandated by the Waste Disposal Act, 157 the
TEPA promulgated the "Measures for Collecting Clean-up and Disposal
Art. 5 In order to obtain the funds for pollution control, population compensation, and
environmental restoration systems based on the polluter pays principle (PPP) should be
established. At the same time, the government may adopt appropriate reward and subsidy
measures (emphasis added).
For the purposes of this paper, the most pertinent provisions of the Outline were prescribed in
Chapter III:
Subchapter VI (Enhancing Industrial Pollution Control):
Art. 1 Proper measures, such as tax incentives, bank loans and technical assistance should be
adopted to facilitate an industry to install pollution control equipment.
Art. 2 The emission standards should be enforced strictly by imposing fines on the violating
sources on a continuing daily basis until the noncompliance stops.
Art. 3 In order to establish systems based on the polluter pays principle (PPP), industries
should be required not only to set up pollution control equipment, but also to pay pollution
charges (emphasis added).
155 OECD, OECD AND THEE NFORCEMENT 24 (1986); see OECD, supra note 152, at 27.
156 See OECD, supra note 152, at 19,28.
157 Article 11 of the Act prescribes:
The implementation agency shall, for the purpose of general waste (municipal trash) clean-up
and disposal, collect fees from the residents in the areas designated for clean-up.
The rate and methods for collecting the fees mentioned in the last subsection shall be
specified by the control agency of the central government with references to the clean-up
methods employed by the local agencies and the costs of installing disposal facilities as well as
other expenses.
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Fees of General Waste" '158 on July 31, 1991. According to the Measures,
trash disposal fees in Taipei City and Kaohsiung City will increase monthly
tap water fees by 24.25 percent and 20 percent respectively. Other cities and
counties near Taiwan Province will add trash disposal fees that will increase
tap water bills by 20 percent, while fees for Kinmen Island and Matsu Island
will increase 23 and 19 percent, respectively.
159
That the trash disposal fees have become the pioneer of all pollution
charges programs is not surprising in view of the mounting pressures for
trash disposal being encountered by all levels of government, especially by
local governments. 160 However, the TEPA was unpersuasive when it tried
to sell this program by not only referring to the PPP, but also by arguing that
residents thereby would be induced to reduce the amount of garbage
produced. One cannot help but doubt whether such trash fees will result in
reduced trash or reduced consumption of tap water.16' The trash disposal
fees were intended to collect revenues for solid waste disposals, and it seems
the only outcome such a policy will achieve.
Besides the trash fees program, at least two other pollution charge
programs are under discussion. One program involves the imposition of air
pollution fees (emission charges) on mobile sources (both automobiles and
motorcycles). 162  The means of collection under consideration include
158 TEPA PUBUC NOTICE 80 (Law) No. 29621 (July 31, 1991), reprinted in 44 TEPA REG. 2
(1991). The term "general waste" in Chinese is equivalent to the English term "solid waste" used in the
United States, yet the general waste in Taiwan is not that solid; chemical analysis shows that over 50.5% of
the garbage is composed of water. See TEPA, THE ROC TAIwAN AREA ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
2356, Table 11-4-4 (1991).
159 In the areas that do not have tap water service, each household will pay a monthly trash disposal
fee of NT$ 765 in Taipei City, NT$ 40 in Kaohsiung City, NT$ 40 throughout the rest of Taiwan, NT$ 50
on Kinmen Island, and NT$ 75 on Matsu Island. See CHINA NEWS, Aug. 31, 1991, at 3.
160 The average daily collection of municipal solid waste reached 18,753 metric tons in 1990,
representing an increase of 114% since 1980 (8736 metric tons per day). See TEPA YEAR BOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS, TAIWAN AREA, THE REPuBUC OF CHINA 134, Table 3-1 (1991).
Since the refusal, disposal has been a responsibility typically shouldered by local governments; many
have suffered serious problems because of insufficient budgets and a lack of landfill sites on such a small,
yet highly populated, island. For the last few years, there have been "trash wars" among local
governments. See, e.g., UNITED DAILY NEWS, July 15, 1992, at 5.
161 A study sponsored by the TEPA on the feasibility of collecting trash disposal fees was issued in
April 1989. (See A STUDY OF THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTING TRASH FEES IN TAIWAN, TEPA RESEARCH
REPORT No. 34044780132 (April 1989)). The means of collection under consideration included adding a
surcharge to tap water and electricity bills and a charge based on the number of members of a household.
The idea and the report were heavily criticized partly because of the questionable connection between the
production of trash and the consumption of electricity, tap water, or the number of members of a
household. However, after a two-year, low-key wait-and-see approach, the TEPA finally put the program
into force with little opposition.
162 This is based on the authorization of Article 10 of the APCA:
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adding a surcharge to the gasoline bill based on the amount purchased,
increasing the annual license fees, or raising the commodity tax paid upon
the purchase of a new car or motorcycle. 163  The other plan is to collect
effluent charges from point sources discharging wastewater into surface
waters.
164
C. Waste Recycling Programs
In response to the rapid increase of municipal waste and the resultant
shortening of the life spans of landfill sites,165 and in recognition of the fact
that garbage actually contains many valuable resources which can be
recycled for usage, 166  the TEPA since 1989 has launched a series of
programs for recycling waste under a campaign entitled "Hsi-Fu" (literally
"Cherish Luck"). Article 10-1 of the Waste Disposal Act provided the legal
basis for these recycling programs.167 So far, nine recycling programs have
The regulatory agencies of all levels of government shall collect air pollution control fees
based upon the type and amount of the air pollutants discharged by polluting sources. The
classification of the sources mentioned in the last subsection and the detailed measures for
collecting the fees shall, after consulting relevant agencies, be promulgated by the regulatory
agency of the central government.
163 See, e.g., UNrrED DAILY NEWS, Sept. 6, 1991, at 5. It was reported that Premier Hau and
Finance Minister Wang warmly endorsed the program because the fees are expected to increase revenues
by NT$ 24 billion a year. See UNITED DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 1991, at 5.
164 See, e.g., S. Lo & D. Shaw, A Study on the Waste Effluent Charges Systems, TEPA REPORT No.
78-03-28-118 (June 1989). The effluent charges are authorized by Article 11 of the WPCA:
The control agencies of local governments shall collect water pollution control fees from the
sources discharging waste water into surface waters based on the quality and quantity of their
discharged waste water, the fees collected shall only be used for water pollution controls.
The measures for collecting the charges mentioned in the last subsection shall be promulgated
by the control agency of the central government.
165 Currently, 93% of the municipal waste is disposed of at landfills, 0.4% by incineration, 0.08%
by composting, and 6.5% by other means such as open burning or river dumping. See TEPA, YEAR BOOK
OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICs, TAIwAN AREA, THE REPUBUiC OF CHINA 134 (1992).
166 An estimate shows that the reusable resources contained in the garbage produced in the Taiwan
area in 1990 amounted to NT$ 30 billion. See ECONOMIC DAILY NEWS, Sept. 9, 1991, at 3.
167 Article 10-1 reads:
The manufacturers, importers, and sellers of an article, its packing or container, which after
consumption, may produce waste with one of the following characteristics, and thus may
seriously pollute the environment, shall be responsible for its collection, clean-up and disposal
if such waste;
1) is difficult to clean up or dispose of
2) has contents which are not biodegradable for a long period;
3) contains hazardous substances.
The classes of the waste, and the scope of the industry manufacturing, the importing and
selling of the article, the packing or container of the waste, mentioned in the last subsection
shall be announced by the regulatory agency of the central government; the measures for
collection, clean-up and disposal of the waste shall be jointly promulgated by the
S-124 VOL. 3 SPEC. ED.
SPEC. ED. 1993 ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS & POLICIES: TAIWAN
been put into force, 168 and another three are expected to follow soon. Table
4 traces the development of the programs by indicating the number and date
of the relevant TEPA public notices. In general, the TEPA has established
these programs in three stages. It first announced that a particular article had
been classified as "non-biodegradable general waste." The TEPA then
promulgated a measure for collecting, cleaning up, and disposing of the
classified article. Finally, it set up the annual percentage of recycling return
for target groups (industries). 169
A closer analysis of these nine measures promulgated for recollection,
clean-up, and disposal is shown in Table 5.170 The most noteworthy among
the regulatory mechanisms are the "deposit-refunded system' ' 71 and the
guaranteed minimum price for the returned articles.
Four of the ten programs with recycling measures, such as the style E
programs for mercury cell batteries, aluminum cans, iron cans, and PET
(polyethylene aerephtalate) bottles, explicitly list a deposit-refund system as
a means of recollection. Two others, specifically the programs for tires and
lubricant oils, employ a guaranteed price system, with the price to be set by
the central agency, as a means of collection. 172 A deposit-refund and a guar-
anteed price for returned articles are parallel in terms of their function. The
remaining three measures did not adopt any specific E/I to facilitate
recycling, but also did not preclude the later application of EI.
173
environmental regulatory agency and the subject-matter regulatory agency of the central
government.
168 In addition to the 10 implemented programs listed on Table 4, a recycling system for waste
paper has long existed. The actual recycling rate of waste paper is 58%. See TEPA, ANNUAL REPORT ON
ENViRONMENTALPROTECTION 1180 (1991).
169 Following the common track of enforcement, Article 23-1 of the Waste Disposal Act prescribes
that a source violating the regulations under Sec. 2 of Art. 10-I will be subject to an administrative fine of
between NT$ 60,000 and NT$ 150,000. If the violations continue after the specified time period allowed
for improvement, a continuous daily fine will be imposed. If the continued violations are found to be
serious, the regulatory agency may order the source to suspend operation for a period of from one month to
one year, or may even order the source to partially or wholly shut down.
170 In order to help readers relate the programs to the types of regulation analyzed in Table 5, a
label of types, from A to F, is included in boldface type with each measure listed in Table 4.
171 A deposit-refund system is a fee with a rebate: those who generate a waste, or purchase a
reusable product, must pay a deposit on the item; when they return the item for proper treatment, they
receive a refund. The deposit provides an incentive for return.
172 See TEPA PuaLIc NOTIcE No. 19,561 (June 17, 1991), reprinted in COMPILATION OF
ENviRORMENTAL LAW AND REGULATIONS V-103 (1992) for the guaranteed prices for waste tires.
173 This interpretation is warranted in view of the relevant provisions. For example, § 4 of the
Measures for Recollecting, Clean-up and Disposing of Capacitors reads:
The capacitor-related industries shall collect the wasted capacitors in accordance with the
following methods:
1) by establishing area-wide recycling depots and centers;
2) by other means announced by the central regulatory agency. [emphasis added].
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Instead of promoting a nationwide waste recycling network supported
by E/I, such as a comprehensive deposit-refund system, the TEPA unwisely
has devoted its attention to importing and installing recycling bins that
resemble extra-terrestrials and are popularly known as "E.T.s"'174 Due to
their high cost 175 and huge size,176 it is impossible to station the recycling
E.T.s effectively. Since the splendid landing of the E.T.s in 1989, two things
have become obvious. One is that they generally are welcomed only in large
institutions, such as schools and large hotels, in which relatively more space
is available and a profit-sensitive authority exists. The other is that only the
most decent, public-minded citizens will sort their garbage first and then
walk for a long distance to feed the stony and unwelcoming E.T.s. 177
So far the limited experiments with the recycling programs have
revealed valuable lessons. First, the simple specification of an annual rate of
return proved to be ineffective. 178 Second, the authorization for founding a
joint disposal fund in each of the nine recycling programs has not led to
productive results. The industries forced to organize such a fund did not
spend the money effectively. 179  Third, the guaranteed price for each
recycled waste tire has resulted in a higher actual rate of recycling than
specified. However, the shortage of equipment for chopping the waste tires
into pieces, 18  as well as of effective uses for the recycled product,
174 Each bin is an "IGLOO" made by Kotrac, a Dutch company. There are four kinds of E.T.s: the
yellow one called "Golden Mouse" for metal cans; the green one known as "Jade Frog" for glass; the red
one known as "Red Pepper" for plastics; and the blue one known as "Dr. Blue" for paper.
175 Each E.T. costs US$ 840 or NT$ 20,000.
176 Each recycling bin is 175 cm in height with a net weight of 100 k.g. and a capacity of about 1
ton.
177 The E.T. program is quite understandable, however, from other viewpoints. For example, the
campaign for E.T.s is something fresh and highly visible in the society.
178 The leading example is the pioneer of the nine programs. The PET bottle industries have failed
to reach the specified goal of 50% return for two consecutive years. See CHINA NEWS, July 29, 1991, at 5.
Although the TEPA did punish the industries for such a failure by fining them between NT$ 60,000
and NT$ 90,000 and setting up a three month deadline for improvement, it did not impose further
punishment, such as continuous daily fines and suspension of operation when the period for compliance
had elapsed and noncompliance continued. Therefore, in January 1992 the Control Yuan passed a
"solution of correction" to push the TEPA for stricter enforcement of law. See UNITED DAILY NEws, Jan.
17, 1992.
179 For example, the PET bottle-related industries have contributed NT$ 1 to the recycling fund
whenever one PET bottle is produced. The industries association admitted that the fund has reached more
than NT$ 200 million. According to the estimate of the Earth Day Association on Taiwan, the fund has
accumulated more than NT$ 400 million. Since its outset, less than NT$ 1 million has been spent
(supposedly only for disposal purposes). See ECONOMIC DAILY NEws, Aug. 10, 1991.
180 The industries have reached the first annual target, 50% of return, yet only 20% of the collected
waste tires have been chopped. See CENTRAL DAILY NEws, Jan. 4, 1992, at 3.
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unexpectedly has stalled the recycling effort.181 It seems fair to say that to
be successful, a recycling program must have comprehensive planning for
upstream waste collection, downstream treatment, and re-use.
Fourth, in the beginning, the deposit-refund systems were not success-
ful. Many regulated industries complained that the deposit 182 was too low to
cover the handling costs, while the citizens wanted to have more recycling
shops and a higher deposit-refund. 183  In response, TEPA pushed the indus-
tries' association to raise the deposit refund to NT$ 2.00 for each PET bottle
returned since March 16, 1992 and to contract a total of 10,600 shops for
return around the whole island. The preliminary results of this new effort
seem very encouraging.
18
D. Emissions Trading Program: Bubbles
Article 15 of the newly revised APCA formally adopted a bubble-like
policy. 185 Despite. all of the unnecessary ambiguities contained in this
provision, one still can easily see the influence of the Final Emission
Trading Policy1 86 announced by the United States EPA in 1986.187
The United States bubble policy 88 allows existing plants to increase
emissions at one or more emissions sources in exchange for larger decreases
181 It was reported that a cement plant had planned to use the chopped tire pieces as subsidiary
fuels, yet the plant finally gave up the plan under the pressure of local residents. See ECONOMIC DAILY
NEwS, Feb. 22, 1992, at 7; see also ECONOMIC DAILY NEWS, June 25, 1992, at 9 (two companies were
selected to be contractors for the final disposal of old tires).
The recycling of waste batteries with mercury cells poses a similar dilemma. See CENTRAL DAILY
NEws, Nov. 8, 1991, at 11.
182 NT$ 0.5 per bottle before March 19, 1992.
183 In a Gallup poll, 55% of the people in the Talpei Metropolitan area indicated that the recycling
points should be increased, and 41% thought the deposit-refund was too low. See CENTRAL DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 11.
184 PET bottles recycled in the first quarter increased by 72% over the same period last year. See
ECONOMIC DAILY NEws, June 9, 1992, at 9.
185 Before the APCA provision was enacted, art. 13 of the Air Pollutants Emission Standards for
Stationary Sources in the Province of Taiwan already permitted internal bubble trades. See COMPILArION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 59 (1987). Yet, to the author's knowledge, no such bubbles
were approved.
186 51 Fed. Reg. 43814-43860 (1986).
187 Specifically, the "baseline" used in such a Talwanese bubble is the applicable emission
standard: "To improve the total the emissions so that they will be less than those specified in the
applicable emission standards" seems to reflect the "net reductions in actual emissions" requirement, and
"it will make positive contributions to the air quality" seems to correspond to the "assurance that bubble is
consistent with ambient progress" requirements. For details, see id. at 43,832; TANG, supra note 1, at 229.
188 The interesting name is derived from its treatment of multiple emission points as if they were
encased in a single bubble. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, On Explaining the Development of "Emissions
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in emissions at other emission sources. In contrast to the original "existing
source bubbles" are the "new source bubbles" which allow trades between
two new sources that are subject to the same New Source Performance Stan-
dards (NSPS)1 9 The use of a bubble enables a firm to adjust the mix of
controls on individual sources so that it can meet the emission limits in a
cost-effective way.190 The bubbles can be extended to include, not only
emission points within the same plant (internal trades) but also emission
points owned by other firms (external trades).
Article 15 of the APCA reads:
The public and private place[s] within the same [air quality]
control region, which [have] more than one stationary source
emitting the same air pollutant, may improve [their] total emis-
sions of a particular air pollutant, so that the total emissions are
less than those specified in the applicable emission standards
and will made positive contributions to the air quality. These
areas may then request the regulatory agency of the provin-
cial/municipal government to review and allow [their]
individual sources to be free from the limitations set by the
emission standards under Section 1, Article 11 of the Act.
The extent of allowance as well as the total amount of emis-
sions and their density, shall be in accordance with the provi-
sions to be established by the regulatory agency of the central
government. [emphasis added]
The controversial wording of this article of the APCA Amendments
needs further analysis in order to clarify the problem. In terms of grammar,
the subject of the first sentence in Section 1 of Article 15 is "the public and
private place(s)." Although in Chinese the singular and plural is not always
clear, the subject here must be singular if the legislators really intended to
allow "bubbles." 191 Reading the subject involved to be plural would imply
strongly that what is involved in this trade are different plants (which may or
may not belong to the same owner) within the same control region, since
Trading" in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation, 7 LAw & POL'Y 447, 455 (1985); Blackman & Baumol,
Modified Fiscal Incentives in Environmental Policy, 56 LAND ECON. 417, 420 (1980).
189 See 50 Fed. Reg. 3688-3695 (1985).
190 See TANG, supra note 1, at 230, for examples.
191 The legislative reasons for this Article, which accompanied the draft submitted by the TEPA to
the Legislative Yuan, indicated clearly that it was aimed at adopting "bubbles." See TEPA, DRAFT OF AIR
POLLUTION AcT AMENDMENTS 15 (Nov. 1989).
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otherwise "within the same control region" will be redundant. 192 This inter-
pretation, however, will essentially convert the bubbles from "plant-wide
emission trading" into "region-wide emission trading." That interpretation
is unacceptable, not because it misconstrues the United States bubble policy,
but because the big jump involved in trading levels is dangerous and
unjustified in terms of environmental policy.193 The problem, therefore, lies
in the "within the same (air quality) control region" language, which is not
only redundant, but also extremely misleading. If the Legislative Yuan
really means to introduce "bubbles," then the phrase "within the same
control region" must be eliminated. 194
If through the amendments the Legislative Yuan meant to adopt a
bubble policy, then the current wording ("which has more than one
stationary source") probably should be interpreted to allow existing source
bubbles only, though the new sources bubbles may also be allowed through
a broader reading of the Article.
VI. PROSPECTS: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Republic of China on Taiwan can draw many useful lessons from
United States environmental law. A comprehensive review of the environ-
mental laws and policies in Taiwan is especially appropriate and necessary
now with the possibility of upgrading the TEPA to the Ministry for Environ-
ment Protection. Because of the limitations of space, only the most urgently
needed general policy reforms shall be mentioned.
In terms of traditional command-and-control regulations, the ROC is
still at a very primitive stage of development. Strictly speaking, it has no
fundamental and coherent regulatory strategies. The lack of unambiguous
goals and credible tools for achieving goals is the most critical problem with
ROC environmental policy and law in the long run.
In particular, the decisions that the Taiwanese WPCA not follow the
United States CWA in adopting the "zero-pollution" goal and the ROC
APCA not mandate "health-based" ambient air quality standards are both
192 A plant that belongs to different air quality control regions is extremely unusual.
193 As explored earlier, supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text, a comprehensive permit system
for stationary sources in Taiwan is still missing and all applicable emission standards are written in terms
of pollutant density with no mass discharge limits. The author can see no reason at present to create a
"freer" market for emission trading in Taiwan than exists in the United States.
194 The central government has not yet promulgated the rules for bubbles transactions as mandated
by sec. 2 of art. 15, APCA.
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correct.195 What the Taiwanese should do now is confirm the water-quality-
oriented strategy in the WPCA and establish the air-quality-oriented strategy
for the APCA. Once the quality-oriented regulatory strategies are installed,
all regulatory mechanisms should be reviewed thoroughly to ensure that they
are consistent with the statutory goal.
During the decisionmaking process, the TEPA should express clearly
the necessary relativism and flexibility involved, so that all participants and
ultimately all the people will be able to make conscious choices, such as how
much money will be spent in exchange for how clean and healthy an
environment.196  Local superiors should be permitted within a specific
range. The existing spatial area units for various environmental regulation
purposes should be redelineated according to the ecological realties, such as
geographical, meteorological, and topographical conditions, instead of being
subject to the limitation of arbitrary and irrelevant political districts. In the
redelineation, the decisionmakers should also try to integrate pollution
control policies with natural resource conservation policies.
97
To conduct all reforms correctly, the TEPA should recognize that
environmental law, just as environmental engineering, is an established
discipline of knowledge. Without the participation of environmental
lawyers, the environmental laws and regulations simply cannot realize the
envisioned policies.
For the time being, the TEPA should take advantage of its almost
limitless discretion, as entrusted to it by the extant system, to set up the
various standards that are still missing and to upgrade the standards that
already have been promulgated. During the process, increasing opposition
and pressure from the affected industries and the allied legislators is
inevitable. But the TEPA can balance the pressures by voluntarily adopting
a more open decision-making process, such as providing notice-comments
and informal hearings for the public. 198  Certainly the quality of
environmental decision-making can be significantly improved by an
institutional fix of law. In my opinion, an administrative agency's discretion
should be subjected to both substantive restrictions and procedural checks.
195 The underlying philosophy of the "zero-pollution goal" and the "health-based" standards are
absolutism and a belief in technological solution. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Vol.
I, §§ 1.2, 3.5 (1986); TANG, supra note 1, at 31-34.
196 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1331, 1351-59 (1985).
197 See OECD, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: INTEGRATED PoUcES 15 (1989).
198 In the absence of a general administrative procedure act, an agency which voluntarily adopts
more "due process" procedures is not only free to proceed, but also widely welcome in view of the soaring
demand for political participation by the general public.
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Yet in light of the United States experience, it seems there is a trade-off
between the substantive restrictions and procedural checks. In particular, the
applicable boundary of the Reservation for Statutes1 99 principle should be
narrowed down, and "an intelligible principle" should be flexibly interpreted
for the exercise of delegated legislative power in order to introduce a more
comprehensive administrative procedure act.2°°
So far, the selective enforcement policy seems to have met with some
success. These limited achievements can be attributed to several factors,
such as the fact that few factories have installed control equipment,20' the
applicable standards are generally quite lenient, and the various problems
inherent in the CAC regulatory approach have not been uncovered or experi-
enced. As the standards become more stringent, however, the enforcement
becomes more vigorous, and as the numerous medium and small businesses
and plants begin to be subjected to regulations, the problems inherent in the
CAC regulatory approach will become more obvious. Under an industrial
structure which is dominantly composed of medium and small businesses,
the demand for the cost-effectiveness of the chosen environmental approach
will probably be much stronger than expected. The TEPA therefore should
be aware of this potential problem and try to explore every possibility of
incorporating various economic-incentive instruments into the present
regulatory system.202  To pursue more effective enforcement, the TEPA
should consider adopting incentive-based noncompliance penalties and a
well-adjusted system of citizen suits and civil penalties.
As to experimental E/I programs, the TEPA should seriously consider
the following suggestions: First, though other agencies may be concerned
mainly, if not merely, with the revenues which an economic instrument can
199 Vorbehalt des Gesetzes.
200 See Dennis Tang, On Rule-making Procedures-An Experiment in the Chinese Transformation
of the US Administrative Procedure Act, in COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT,
EXEcUTIE YUAN, COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACTs 321, 344 (1990) for
details.
201 For example, the Taipei city government conducted an investigation of the 35 registered rubber
manufacturers in August 1988 and found that only 2 plants had installed some sort of pollution control
equipment. See Current Development, 7 INDUS. POLLUTION CONTROL, at 33 (1988). It is generally
believed that the situation with the illegal (not registered) plants, which are quite popular in Taiwan, is
even worse.
The situation may be improving. Statistics of the Bureau of Statistics, Executive Yuan, show that
among the 1022 private manufacturers investigated, the average investment on environmental protection in
1991 was NT$ 5.12 million, an amount 8 times more than that of 1980 (NT$ 620,000). See ECONOMIC
DAILY NEWS, June 1, 1992, at 3.
202 The author has offered a two-stage proposal for the adoption of a hybrid economic incentive
system with an implementation timetable. See TANG, supra note I, at 301-403.
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generate, the TEPA ultimately should be concerned with the "environmental
impact" that such an E/I may have. Although some trade-offs among the
goals of an environmental policy are inevitable, if an E/I program sacrifices
all of its environmental impact for the administrative convenience of collect-
ing revenues, it may no longer be an E/I worthy of adoption, or indeed may
be only a tax hike in the guise of environmental protection. A reasonable
connection between the fees paid and the pollution produced (i.e., the quan-
tity and the hazardousness of the pollutants involved) is necessary for the
environmental significance of an E/I program. Only well-designed E/I pro-
grams will create incentives for public goals (i.e., improving the
environment) to become private interests.
Second, besides setting up the annual rates of return and pushing for
the establishment of joint disposal funds, the TEPA should more actively
intervene in: (1) standardizing the sizes and materials of the items for
recycling, such as PET bottles and aluminum cans; (2) requiring all retail
dealers to join the recycling programs; (3) guiding the expenditures of the
joint disposal fund for speeding up the exportation/transfer or the
importation of the necessary disposal know-how and collective disposal
facilities;203 and (4) raising the deposit refund periodically to make sure that
enough economic incentive is provided. 2 4
Third, the TEPA should be very cautious in initiating an emission
trading program. The earlier analysis of Article 15 of the APCA shows that
the TEPA is not familiar with the origin, the evolution, and the problems
with the United States EPA's Emission Trading Program.20 5 In view of the
fact that there has been no comprehensive permit system in Taiwan, and that
all regulatory standards are written in terms of concentration only, the TEPA
has additional reasons to be prudent in adopting bubbles and related policies,
such as offsets and banking,20 6 since the "paper credits" problem may arise,
and the ambient air quality may therefore be further deteriorated.
203 If the relevant industry associations are not interested in capitalizing the fund, the TEPA should
open the door to others.
204 Though the TEPA successfully raised the deposit for each PET bottle from NT$ 0.5 to NT$ 2.0,
compared to the deposit of NT$ 4.0 provided for each bottle by the Taiwan Tobacco & Wine Monopoly
Bureau, it is probably still too low to provide strong incentives for recycling.
205 See TANG, supra note 1, at 213-40 for a detailed analysis.
206 An earlier draft of the Amendments to the APCA, proposed by the predecessor of the TEPA in
1985, adopted offset and banking in place of bubbles. For some unknown reason, the TEPA dropped
offset and banking policies in the proposed draft which became the 1992 Amendments.
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TABLE 1 MAJOR U.S. AND R.O.C. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
(Taiwanese legislation indidated in bold type)
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Period -1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-
Subject
General National International Pollution
Policy Environ- Environ- Prevention
mental mental Act of 1990
Policy Act Protection
of 1969 Actof 1983
Air Air Clean Air CAA APCA CAA
Pollution Pollution Act (CAA) Amend. of Amend. of Amend. of
Control Control Act of 1963 1970 1982 1990
of 1955
Motor CAA APCA
Vehicle Air Amend. of Amend. of
Pollution 1977 1992
Control Act
of 1965 Air
Pollution
Air Quality Control Act
Act of 1967 (APCA) of
1975
Water Rivers and FWPCA Water FWPCA Water WPCA
Pollution Harbors Amend. of Quality Act Amend. of Quality Amend. of
Control Act of 1899 1956 of 1965 1972 Control Act 1991
of 1987
Federal FWPCA
Water Amend. of WPCA
Pollution 1977 Amend. of
Control Act 1983
(FWPCA) Water
of 1948 Pollution
Control Act
(WPCA) of
1974
Safe SDWA
Drinking Amend. of
Water Act 1986
(SDWA) of
1974
Drinking
Water
Manage-
ment Act of
________ __ ________ ________1972 ____ _____
The Draft of Environmental Protection Fundamental Act and the Draft of Environmental Impact
Assessment Act are pending in the Legislative Yuan.
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(TABLE 1) (Continued)
Period -1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-
Subject
Water Safe Drinking SDWA
Pollution Water Act Amend. of
Control (SDWA) of 1986
1974
Drinking
Water
Management
Act of 1972
Marine MPRSA Oil Pollution
Protection, Amend. of Act of 1990
Research and 1980
Sanctuaries
Act (MPRSA)
of 1972
MPRSA
Amend. of
1977
Noise Noise NCA Noise NAC
Control Control Act Amend. of Control Amend. of
(NCA) of 1972 Act (NAC) 1992
1965 of 1983
Quiet
Communities
Act of 1978
Waste Solid Waste Resources Hazardous Federal
Management Disposal Act Recovery Act and Solid Facility
of 1965 of 1970 Waste Compliance
Amend. of Act of 1992
Resources 1984
Conservation
and Recovery WDA
Act of 1976 Amend. of
1980
Waste
Disposal Act WDA
(WDA) of Amend. of
1974 1985
WDA
Amend. of
1988
Medical
Waste
Tracking
Act of 1988
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TABLE 1 (continued)
S-135
Period -1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-
Subject
Waste Comprehen- Communit
Management sive Environ- y Environ-
mental mental
Response, Response
Compen- Facilitation
sation and Act of 1992
Liability Act
(CERCLA
Super-fund)
of 1980
Super-fund
Amendments
and
Reauthori-
zation Act of
1986
Toxic Hazardous Toxic
Substances Materials Chemicals
Control Transpor- Regulation
tation Act of Act (TCRA)
1975 of 1986
Toxic TCRA
Substances Amend. of
Control Act 1988
of 1976
Pesticides Federal FIFRA
Control Insecticide, Amend. of
Fungicide, 1988
and Rodenti-
cide Act PRA
(FIFRA) of Amend. of
1972 1986
Pesticide
Regulation
Act (PRA)
of 1972
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Period -1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-
Subject
Radiation Atomic AEC Atomic AEC Low-Level
Energy Act Amend. of Energy Act Amend. of Radioactive
(AEC) of 1954 (AEA) of 1970 Waste
1946 1968 Policy Act
AEC Uranium (LLPWPA)
Amend. of Mill of 1981
1959 Tailings
Radiation Nuclear
Control Act Waste
(UMTRCA) Policy Act
of 1978 (NWPA) of
1982
AEA
Amend. of UMTRCA
1971* Amend. of
1983
LLPWPA
Amend. of
1985
NWPA
Amend. of
1987
Land Use Taylor Multiple Federal Hillside
and Grazing Use, Land Policy Conserva-
Conservation Act of 1934 Sustained- and Man- tion and
Yield Act agement Act Utilization
(MUSYA) of 1976 Act of 1980
of 1960
UPA
MUSYA Amend. of
Amend. 1973
of 1968
Area
Urban Planning
Planning Act of
Act (UPA) 1974
of 1964
* A relevant act is Nuclear Damage Compensation Act of 1971 & 1977.
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Period -1949 1950-1959 11960-1969 11970-1979 1 1980-1989 1990-
Subject I
Land Use
and Conser-
vation
National
Trails
System Act
of 1962
National
Coastal
Zone
Manage-
ment Act
(NCZMA)
of 1972
National
Reserves
Manage-
ment Act
(NRMA)
of 1974
National
Parks Act
of 1972
NCZMA
Amend. of
1980
Alaskan
National
Interests
Land
Conserva-
tion Act of
1980
Coastal
Barrier
Resources
Act of 1982
Wilderness Antarctic
Act of 1964 Conserva-
tion Act of
Wild and 1978
Scenic
Rivers Act Endangered
of 1968 American
Wilderness
Act of 1978
National
Forest
Manage-
ment Act of
1976
Forest Act
of 1972
Surface
Mining
Control and
Reclamation
Act of 1977
Mineral
Industry
Act of 1978
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TABLE I (Continued)
Period -1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-
Subject
Land Use Cultural
and Assets
Conservation Preserva-
tion
I Act of 1982 1
WilOlife
Conserva-
tion
Anadro-
mous Fish
Conserva-
tion Act of
1965
Fur Seal Act
of 1966
Endangered
Species
Preserva-
tion Act of
1966
Endangered
Species
Conserva-
tion Act of
1969
Marine
Mammal
Protection
Act of 1972
Endangered
Species Act
(ESA) of
1973
Fishery
Conserva-
tion and
Manage-
ment Act
(Magnuson
Act) of 1976
Whale
Conserva-
tion and
Protection
Study Act of
1976
Fish and
Wildlife
Improve-
ment Act of
1978
Fish and
Wildlife
Conserva-
tion Act of
1980
Magnuson
Act Amend.
of 1982
ESA
Amend. of
1988
Wildlife
Conserva-
tion Act of
1989
Fishery
Act of 1989
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TABLE 2 U.S. AND R.O.C. NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS
Pollutant Averaging Time Primary standard Secondary Standard
(health rlated) (Welfare related)
Particulate annual 50 pg/m3  65 pl/m3  Same as None
matter (PM 10)t (arithmetic mean) primary
24-hour* 150 pg/m3  125 p/m3  Same as None
(average) primary
Sulfur dioxide Annual 80 g/m 3  0.03 ppm None None
(SO2 ) (arithmetic mean) (0.03 ppm)
24-hour* 365 pg/i 3  0.1 ppm None None
(maximum) (0.14 ppm)
3-hour* None None 1300 pg/im3  None
(maximum) (0.50 ppm)
1-hour None 0.25 ppm None None
Carbon 8-hour * (average) 10 pg/m3  9 ppm None None
monoxide (CO) (9 ppm)
1-hour* (average) 40 gg/m3  35 ppm None None(35 ppm)
Nitrogen Annual (arithmetic mean) 1005/m 3  0.05 ppm Same as None
dioxide (NO2 ) (0.O55ppm) primary
1-hour None 0.25 ppm None None
Ozone (03) Maximum Dally 1-hour 235g/im3  0.12 ppm Same as None
average* (0.12 ppm) Primary
8-hour Average None 0.06 ppm None None
Lead (Pb) 3-month (maximum 50 pg/m3  None Same as None
arithmetic mean) Primary
1-month Average None 1.0pg/im3  None None
(United States standards are indicated in standard type and ROC standards appear in bold type.)
Source: 40 CFR 50 (1991); R.O.C. Environmental Protection Agency Register No. 53, at 23 (May,
1992).
Notation: pug/m 3 is micrograms per cubic meter.
mg/im3 is milligrams per cubic meter.
ppm is parts per million.
j PM1 o (particles < 10,u in diamter) replaced the original TSP as the new indicator pollutant
in July 1987, ( 52 FR 24663 ].
• not to be exceeded more than once a year.
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Table 3 TYPES OF PERMITS USED IN STANDARDS
Air Water
Total agencies reported 30 44
Proportions of limitations used:
Concentration 97% 100%
Mass/unit input* 97% 36%
Mass/unit output 70% 50%
Mass/unit time
per minute 10% 4%
per hour* 70% 9%
per day* 33% 59%
per week 7% 14%
per month* 7% 27%
per year* 33% 7%
Source: RFF, Survey of State Agency Surveillance Activities and Practices (1982) cited from C. Russell,
W. Harrington & W. Vaughan, Enforcing Pollution Control Laws 19, Table 2-2 (1986).
Reprinted by permission of Resources for the Future.
* Difference in proportion between air and water programs significant at 5 percent level or better.
S-140
SPEC. ED. 1993 ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS & POLICIES:TAIWAN S-141
TABLE 4 DEVELOPMENT OF WASTE RECYCLING PROGRAMS
Classification Measures
Announced Promulgated
Annual Rate of Return
Specified/Actual
PET Bottles 78 (Waste) 78 (Waste) 60% [06/26f 92 - 06125f93] 81 (Waste) No. 34523
No. 03051 No. 17038 [08/14/1992]
[01/31/1989] [0611611989]E
55% [06126T91 - 06/25Tf921 80 (Waste) No. 41936
[11/01/1991]
50% [06/26P90 - 06/25f91] 79 (Waste) No. 40416
26.1% [11/10/1990]
50% [06/26P89 - 60/25f90] 78 (Waste) No. 19318
33.5% [07/03/1989]
Tires 78 (Toxic) 78 (Toxic) 80% 10101f/92 - 09/30f93] 81 (Waste) No. 39794
No. 18400 No.28780 [10/09/1992]
[06/24/1989] [09/20/1989]C
70% [10/01P91 - 09/30/f921 80 (Toxic) No. 43860
[10/23/1991]
50% [10/01f90 - 09/30f91] 80 (Toxic) No. 16309
60.4% [05/10/1991]
50% [Nov.'89 - Nov.'90] 79 (Toxic) No. 20802
[06/27/1990]
Insecticide 78 (Toxic) 79 (Waste) 60% [07/01f92 - 06130/f93] 81 (Waste) No. 45506
Containers No.24206 No. 27192 [10/09/1992]
[08/08/1989] [08/20/1990]A
50% [07/01f91 - 06/30f 92]
[07/01/1991]
Pesticide 78 (Toxic) 79 (Waste) 55% [04/01T92 - 03/31P93] 81 (Waste) No. 34408
Containers No.30963 No. 3374 [08/04/1992]
[10/18/1989] [09/21/1990]A
20% [04/01f91 - 0331f/92] 80 (Toxic) No. 10613
[03/28/1991]
Aluminum 78 (Waste) 79 (Waste) 60% [01101f93 - 12/31f 93] 82 (Waste) No. 01034
Cans No.39756 No. 29015 [01/18/1993]
[12/21/1989] [08/31/1990]E
55% [01/01f 92 - 12/31f92] 81 (Waste) No. 15311
[04/1511992]
30% [01/01f/91 - 12/31 f91] 70 (Waste) No. 45740
31.8% [12/31/1990]
Iron Cans 78 (Waste) 79 (Waste) 60% [01101/93 - 12/31f93] 82 (Waste) No. 01035
No.39756 No.29106 [01/18/1993]
[12/21/1989] [08/31/1990]E
55% [01/01P92 - 12/31f/92] 81 (Waste) No. 15343
[05/01/19921
20% [01/01f91 - 12/31f/91] 79 (Waste) No.45741
21.4% [12/14/1990
Phases
Items
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOuRNAL
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Phases Classification Measures Annual Rate of Return
Items Announced Promulgated Specified/Actual
Lubricant 79 (Waste) 79 (Waste) Not applicable, but semiannual report
Oils No. 01384 No. 14450 required since 01/01/1992.
[01/22/1990] [05/25/1990]B 5.4% 80 (Audit) No.37471 [09/12/1991]
Capacitors 79 (Waste) 79 (Waste) 50% [07/01f92 - 06130'93] 81 (Waste) No.34593
No. 10992 No.29008 [08/26/1992]
[04/24/1990] [08/31/1990]D
30% [07/01-91 - 06/30/92] 80 (Waste) No.09606
[03/0501992]
Mercury 79 (Waste) 79 (Waste) 40% [01/01f93 - 12/31P93]
cell No. 15562 No. 29177 81 (Waste) no. 51164
batteries [05/21/1990] [08/31/1990]E [12/08/1992]
30% [01/01/92- 12/31/'92]*
5% [01/01/'91 - 12/31P91]
5.4% 79 (Waste) No. 45757
[12/19/1990]
Fluorescent 79 (Waste)
light tubes No. 27051
[08/22/1990]
Styrofoam 81 (Waste) 80 (Waste)
containers No. 05740 No. 34551
[03103/1992] [08/30/1991]F
80 (Audit)
No. 23331
[07/11/1991]
Aluminum 81 (Waste)
Foil No.39640
Lining [09/10/1992]
(Actual rate of return figures are indicated in bold type.)
Sources: Annual Report on Environmental Protection 184 (Table 4-2-1) (1991); TEPA Register No. 15,
20,21,22,23,26,27,30,31,34,35,36,37,40,42,43,44,47,52,54,56,57, 58,59 & 62.
* For some unknown reason, the notice was not formally made public on the TEPA Register.
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TABLE 5 ANALYSIS OF RECYCLING PROGRAMS
Contents Collection _ Disposal
Target How (Means) Joint Fund
Group I
Related Recycling De- Special Price Annual Super- Rate Means
busi- bins posit storage guar- rate of visory set up restric-
nesses depots & refund require- antees return commit- procedure tions
Types centers syste ments specified tee
A * * * Report
B * * * Report *
C * * 1 *2 * * Report *
D * * * * * Report *
E * * * * * Report
F * * * Report& *
Approval
1 See TEPA, Public Notice 80 (Toxic) No. 30024, appeared in TEPA Register No. 44, at 11 (Aug., 1991).
2 See TEPA, Public Notice 80 (Toxic) No. 19561, appeared in TEPA Register No. 43, at 14 (July, 1991).
Figure I Enforcement Structure Under The Clean Air Act
Citizens Federal (EPA) --- +States 0 ViolatorI of either
0 SIP/Permit Provision,
Federal Emission
0Standards, or
Monitoring/inspection
Requirement
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